# Making Democracy Work for Women:

# Essays on Women's Political Participation in Pakistan

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ABSTRACT

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The existence of stark and enduring gender inequalities in political participation and representation around the world is a well-documented phenomenon. What constrains women from participating in politics? How can we encourage more women to participate? What are the substantive implications of nominal equality in participation? In this dissertation, I explore these questions in the context of Pakistan: a developing democracy with high levels of gender inequality on various dimensions. An overarching goal of this work is to center the role of the household – and the sexual division of household labor – in our understanding of gender roles and gendered inequalities in political participation. In Paper 1, I develop an original behavioral measure of preference expression, embedded in a survey with 800 respondents in Faisalabad, to demonstrate that even when women participate in political communication, they overwhelmingly opt to communicate their spouse's political preferences to a political representative, rather than their own. The ability to express and communicate preferences is key to many definitions of democracy. While existing work studies external constraints on preference expression in the public sphere, in this paper I demonstrate the persistence of internal constraints on women's preference expression that operate in the private sphere. In Paper 2, coauthored with Ali Cheema, Asad Liaqat and Shandana Khan Mohmand, we use a field experiment conducted in 2500 households in Lahore to study what works to mobilize women's turnout. The design of the experiment relies on the understanding that women's participation in this context is shaped by household level con-

straints. We test whether targeting a canvassing treatment prior to the 2018 Pakistan National Election emphasizing the importance of women's vote works best when targeted to women, men, or both. We find that it is insufficient to target women, and necessary to target men, in order to increase women's electoral turnout. In Paper 3, I draw on the conceptual framework of role equity and role transformation to understand variation in public attitudes towards gender equality. I use survey data collected in Faisalabad and Lahore to demonstrate how abstract support for gender equality in various domains breaks down in the face of material costs and circumstances that pose a threat to status-quo gender roles.

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Finally, no one could have been happier about the completion of my PhD than my late grandfather, and it is to his memory that I dedicate this dissertation.

*To Dada Abbu*

# Introduction

The 2013 General Elections in Pakistan were a defining moment in the country's experience with electoral democracy. They marked the first transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another, thus fulfilling Przeworski et al. (2000)'s minimalist definition of an electoral democratic regime for the first time in Pakistan's history. As I write this in 2019, after another democratic transfer of power under the 2018 elections, progress on a broader set of democratic freedoms remains stalled and uneven. In particular, citizens are far from enjoying Dahl (1973)'s ideal of unimpaired opportunities to formulate, signify and have their preferences weighted equally in the conduct of government. Importantly, these freedoms, to the extent that they exist, are unequally distributed along gender lines: women remain systematically and disproportionately excluded from these opportunities. The subject of this dissertation is the nature, causes, and consequences of this systematic exclusion.

In three complementary essays, this dissertation analyzes gender inequalities in political participation in Pakistan, with particular attention to how intra-household inequality and gender roles borne out of the sexual division of household labor shape these inequalities. It joins a body of recent comparative work on gender and political participation in the developing world which addresses gender gaps

in political preferences (Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson, 2016; Brule and Gaikwad, 2017), centers the role of the family and household (Chhibber, 2002; Prillaman, 2017), and interrogates the role of gender as a shaping force in men and women's political lives (Robinson and Gottlieb, 2019). In interrogating the causes of inequality in political participation, the project speaks to the research agenda identified by Burns, Schlozman and Verba (2001) in *The Private Roots of Public Action* to understand persisting gender inequalities in political participation by examining inequalities in nonpolitical life.

Methodologically, I rely primarily on quantitative analysis of original survey data collected through two surveys conducted in the Faisalabad and Lahore districts of Pakistan. In all three papers, the design of survey measures – and in the case of Paper 2, the design of the canvassing intervention – is informed by interviews and conversations with politicians, party workers, civil rights activists, and government officials conducted in Lahore and Islamabad between 2015-18, as well as focus group discussions conducted with men and women voters in Lahore during 2017-18. I also make use of experimental methods as a tool for measurement and causal identification in this dissertation. In Paper 1, I conduct a measurement experiment, employing a randomized cost strategy to measure respondents' valuation of their own preferences relative to those of their spouse, and the sensitivity of this valuation to monetary costs. Paper 2 draws on a large-scale voter canvassing field experiment, conducted with 2500 households in collaboration with civil society and government partners in advance of the 2018 General Elections in Pakistan. Paper 3 employs a randomized informational treatment embedded in a survey to causally identify the effect of providing accurate information about levels of gender inequality in education on respondents' support for gender-equalizing policy.

The task of describing levels and patterns of gender inequality is integral to this dissertation. When I began fieldwork in Pakistan, I embarked on a long chase

to obtain gender disaggregated turnout data at the constituency level for the 2013 elections. I heard different stories along the way, and for a while was convinced that the data existed, but that I was unable to access it. However, during an interview in 2015, an official at the Election Commission of Pakistan revealed to me that the relevant administrative reporting form for returns at the polling station level was not formatted for separately reporting men and women's turnout in 2013. As a result, the votes from male and female polling booths in mixed gender polling booths were pooled, counted and reported in the aggregate. While it was possible to retrieve partial information about the gender gap in turnout by looking solely at polling station returns for separate men and women's polling stations, I have become increasingly convinced that the gender disaggregated data from mixed polling stations in 2013 simply do not exist. In the absence of these data, it is difficult to assess the true extent of the gender gap in voter turnout in Pakistan's 2013 election. I once received a file from a journalist reporting the gender gap in turnout at the constituency level in the 2013 elections, but given the absence of these turnout numbers at the polling station level, I remain wary of using this data. The 2018 election data is a different story, where the gender disaggregated turnout data at the polling station level is publicly available for nearly every polling station in the country, though not digitized for analysis at the time of writing this. In a data-scarce environment, the task of description becomes all the more important to understand the true extent of inequality, patterns of variation and potential drivers of this variation. I hope that the data collection conducted as part of this project can enhance our collective understanding of patterns of gender inequality in the political sphere in Pakistan, and help us tell more nuanced stories about the issue.

**Paper 1: Count Me Out**

In Paper 1, I focus on 2 key questions: 1) do men and women have different preferences for public goods and services? 2) do men and women express these preferences at different rates? I use a face-to-face survey conducted in 800 households in the Faisalabad district of Pakistan to show that men and women within the same household prioritize systematically different public goods and services. These differences in preferences map on to the disproportionate benefits of various goods and services that accrue to men and women as a result of the gendered division of household labor. Using a novel behavioral measure of political communication, I demonstrate that women attach a lower value to their distinctive preferences than men, and are less willing to communicate these preferences to political representatives. Even when offered a free and anonymized opportunity to communicate preferences to their local representative, women, who may not otherwise have many opportunities for such communication, overwhelmingly choose to pass on their spouse's preferences instead of their own. Meanwhile, men, who otherwise have much higher rates of contact with local representatives, still use the opportunity to pass on their own preferences rather than their spouses. The gendered asymmetry in preference expression and communication has implications for democratic theories of representation: it suggests that the link between political participation and substantive representation may be undermined by constraints to preference expression faced by women.

Does the gender gap in preference expression "matter" because men and women actually hold different preferences, and potentially have divergent interests? In other words, if men and women within the same household were to hold exactly the same preferences, should we still care about whose preferences are communicated to political representatives? I would argue yes, and rely on Mansbridge's formulation to defend this:

> One problem with blithely forsaking political equality on the grounds that interests are equal is that power acquired in one decision carries over to another. If one person consistently is more able to get others to do what they would otherwise not do, this inequality may not be relevant when interests are identical, but it becomes relevant as soon as interests diverge, which they are bound to do at some point. The community's reliance on that person gives her or him greater political resources when interests diverge. In short, political equality may be irrelevant at any one moment, but it must be maintained against the day when it will be essential. On an individual level, even when two people assess their interests as identical not only at present but for the foreseeable future, they may want to feel free to change in unpredictable ways so that their interests would begin to diverge; and to hedge against this possibility by maintaining equal power between them. (Mansbridge, 1977)

On the one hand, this paper does document the existence of intra-household differences in men and women's preferences. However, I would argue that the substantively and significantly large gender gap in preference expression also documented in the paper presents a fundamental problem of inequality in the political sphere, regardless of the content of men and women's preferences, which may change, converge or diverge at different times and in different contexts.

**Paper 2: Canvassing the Gatekeepers**

This paper, coauthored with Ali Cheema, Asad Liaqat and Shandana Khan Mohmand, uses a field experiment conducted with 2500 households in the city of Lahore to study the impact of a voter canvassing campaign on women's turnout in the 2018 Pakistan General Election. The design of the canvassing campaign draws on a rich literature identifying various factors that may constrain women's political participation: gender gaps in political knowledge, civic skills, mobilization, and gendered "psyche" (Burns, Schlozman and Verba, 2001; Fox and Lawless, 2010; Preece, 2016). The experiment follows a factorial design, whereby the campaign is randomly targeted at either women in households, men in households, or both. The variation

in targeting is rooted in the understanding emerging from Paper 1 that women are not always making autonomous decisions about their own political participation. Rather, men may act as gatekeepers of women's participation, by either 1) explicitly preventing women from participating, as documented anecdotally in the case of community bans on women's voting in certain parts of Pakistan, or 2) implicitly dampening the potential for participation insofar as women may internalize norms of permission-seeking and deference to men, as evinced by the patterns of behavior documented in Paper 1.

Through comparing differences in voter turnout, which is visually verified by observing the indelible ink mark on study participants' thumbs in the days following the 2018 Election, across study households, we find that non-partisan canvassing only improves women's turnout when canvassers target men in households. Targeting women alone is insufficient to effect changes in women's political participation on Election Day. Moreover we find that the canvassing campaign does not seem to produce improvements among women on standard individual predictors of political participation i.e. political knowledge, interest or self-efficacy. However, using a costly behavioral measure of support for women's role in democracy, we find that men who were targeted with the canvassing treatment express higher levels of support for women's role in democracy beyond Election Day. Results from a post-election survey also suggest that households where both men and women received the treatment saw greater political discussion among men and women, and that men in these households were more likely to provide logistical support such as transport assistance to women on Election Day. Overall, we find that the campaign is able to increase women's electoral turnout without positively impacting women's individual resources or motivation, but rather by influencing men in households.

Taken together, these findings provide suggestive evidence for male gatekeep-

ing as a binding constraint on women's participation. They have theoretical implications for understanding women's political participation in a context where women enjoy limited agency within the household, and practical implications for designing effective interventions to improve women's participation under such conditions.

**Paper 3: Limits to Equality**

This paper draws on survey data from 800 households in Faisalabad and 2500 households in Lahore to understand variation within and across individuals in public attitudes around gender inequality in two issue areas: 1) women's political participation and 2) girls' education. I assess the extent to which Gelb and Palley (1982)'s classification scheme of gender issues into issues of role equity or role change is helpful in explaining variation in support for equality across issues.

I find that reported support for women's equal participation in politics is highly sensitive to perceived threats to status-quo gender roles. Within the domain of political participation, activities like voting that pose a lower challenge to status-quo gender roles enjoy greater public perception of "appropriateness." At the same time, activities themselves are not *inherently* threatening or non-threatening to gender roles; rather their construction as such depends highly on political elites' framing. I demonstrate how this operates in the case of public perceptions of the appropriateness of women's rally attendance in the leadup to the 2018 election.

I also explore public attitudes and support for equalizing policy in a different domain: girls' schooling, an issue where unlike political participation, there is popular consensus on the equal importance of girls' participation. I hypothesize that for an issue like equal access to education, which is more likely to be seen as a role equity than a role change issue, public support for policy that promotes girls' schooling is likely to be sensitive to perceived levels of inequality and the *need* for

the policy rather than its *appropriateness*. I test this by looking observationally at the levels of support for initiatives for girls education at different levels of perceived inequality, and by randomly providing respondents information about the true level of inequality to test whether learning accurate information makes them more or less supportive of policies that would reduce inequality. I find a complicated picture: while women's attitudes follow the hypothesized pattern, and women respond in the expected way to accurate information by increasing their support for the policy, the pattern for men's attitudes is reverse of expectations.

While the role equity and role change classification of gender issues provides a useful common framework to think about public attitudes towards gender issues, added attention to elite framing strategies, and how men and women perceive gender issues differently allows for a fuller understanding of what drives variation in these public attitudes.

Chapter 1

# Count Me Out:

# *Women's Unexpressed Preferences* *

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# Abstract

I develop and test a theory of how gender inequality within the household is reproduced in the political sphere, and undermines prospects for women's substantive representation. Drawing on an original face-to-face survey conducted in 800 households in the Faisalabad district of Pakistan, I show that men and women within the same household prioritize systematically different public goods and services based on the context-specific division of household labor. Using a novel behavioral measure of political communication, I demonstrate that women attach a lower value to their distinctive preferences than men, and are less willing to communicate these preferences to political representatives. The gendered asymmetry in preference assertion has implications for democratic theories of representation: it suggests that the link between political participation and substantive representation may be undermined by gender inequality within the household.

## 1.1 Introduction

Does increased political participation by women result in the improved representation of their preferences? Government responsiveness to citizen preferences is a foundational goal for democracy. Attention and responsiveness to citizen preferences, concerns, and interests is also what constitutes "substantive representation" (Pitkin, 1967)[2]. However, women, as a group, have historically been denied the opportunity to express their preferences. Prior to universal suffrage, women were explicitly excluded from the right to vote – an institutional guarantee necessary for signifying preferences in a democracy –thus precluding any electoral incentive for representatives to appeal to them, or account for their preferences. Today, despite widespread *de jure* guarantees for political equality, women continue to face significant barriers to equal political participation and representation. What explains the disjuncture between *de jure* guarantees to equality and the *de facto* conditions of political inequality that exist between men and women? This question is of interest for scholars of democracy, policymakers, and advocates for women's rights. Moreover, it is one with substantial consequences for women's welfare.

To answer this question, I draw attention to the role of the household as a mediator between citizens and the state. I develop a theory of how household inequality impacts both the content of men and women's preferences, and their willingness to express and assert these preferences. I test this using an original survey of 800 households, conducted in the Faisalabad district of the Punjab province, Pakistan, which includes a novel behavioral measure of political communication with local level representatives. The setting for the study allows us to better understand the

[2]Pitkin defines substantive representation as "acting in the interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them." However, the question of whether and how "women's interests" can be defined is a contested one, since it runs the risk of minimizing important differences and other salient forms of group identity amongst women. See Celis et al. (2014) for an extensive review of the various theoretical and empirical approaches employed by scholars of gender and politics in recent work on women's representation.

prospects for women's representation in a context where the stakes are especially high: Pakistan ranked 143rd out of 144th on the Global Gender Gap Index in 2016[3].

The household is the most basic unit in many models of decision-making, but treating it as a unit with common preferences obscures a set of complex within-household dynamics. In recent years, development economists have pushed against this unitary conceptualization of the household, instead drawing attention to the existence of difference preferences among household members, the dynamics of bargaining within the household, and gender asymmetries in bargaining power (Agarwal, 1997; Sen, 1990). However, these intra-household dynamics are often ignored in the study of political behavior. While there is ample work documenting and seeking to explain persistent gender gaps in political participation and representation in a variety of contexts[4], empirical evidence on the link between intra-household disparities and patterns of political inequality is somewhat scarce[5]. This paper takes forward the research agenda of empirically investigating the "relationship between inequality at home and citizen politics" identified by Burns, Schlozman and Verba (1997). I explore how hierarchies within the household shape the content of men and women's political preferences, and their relative willingness to express those preferences. In order to represent citizen's preferences, representatives need information on the content of those preferences. The willingness to express and communicate preferences on part of citizens is therefore a prerequisite for representation.

[3]The index is part of the Global Gender Gap Report, published annually since 2006 by the World Economic Forum. It "quantifies the magnitude of gender disparities and tracks their progress over time, with a specific focus on the relative gaps between women and men across four key areas: health, education, economy and politics." See here for more details on construction of the Index: `http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-report-2016/measuring-the-global-gender-gap/`

[4]See Kittilson (2016) for a recent review

[5]Notable exceptions include Burns, Schlozman and Verba (1997); Chhibber (2002); Iversen and Rosenbluth (2010)

I argue that the gendered division of labor within the household implies that men and women within the same household benefit differentially from certain public goods and services, and that this shapes their preferences over public good provision. I identify significant differences in men and women's stated preferences over a set of local public goods and services in my survey sample. Women prioritize goods such as drinking water, healthcare, and income supplementing schemes, which are likely to benefit them disproportionately. On the other hand men tend to prioritize roads and transport, which they are more likely to use given their patterns of frequent travel outside the home for work.

I also document stark gender differences in all self-reported forms of electoral and inter-electoral political participation: voting, communication, rally/meeting attendance, as well as in reported access to representatives at all levels of government. Under-participation by women, coupled with a gender gap in preferences, means that women's distinctive demands and voices are systematically excluded from political decision-making. Would women's preferences be better represented if women participated in higher numbers? I argue that higher levels of participation by women may be necessary, but not sufficient, to guarantee the representation of their preferences.

To demonstrate this, I employ a novel behavioral measure of preference expression which allows me to study how men and women respond differentially to an equal opportunity to communicate their preferences to local representatives. When faced with a choice of whether to anonymously communicate their own preferences to a local representative at no cost, a striking 76% of women forego the opportunity to make their own preferences known, and instead choose to pass on their spouse's preferences. Men behave in exactly the opposite way: under the same conditions of anonymity and no cost, 88% choose to communicate their own preferences over their spouse's. Moreover, women's willingness to communicate their own prefer-

ences decreases in how different they perceive their preferences being from their spouse's, as well as in how different their preferences actually are. Gender inequality in the preference expression thus persists even when the level of political participation is held equal across men and women. However, in households where women have greater bargaining power (as proxied by their opportunities outside the household, and their status relative to their spouse), the patterns of political expression are less distorted.

These findings have important implications for how we understand the linkage between citizens' preferences, participation and representation. It appears that at least under conditions of deep household inequality, the gains from improvements in nominal levels of women's political participation may be limited. Under such conditions, women are demonstrably reticent to use opportunities to participate to assert their own preferences. The prospects for women's substantive representation may be especially low when the stakes are highest, i.e. when women's preferences are substantively distinct from those of men, since that is when women are least likely to make their preferences known.

The 1960s feminist rallying cry "personal is political" informs the design of this study, and helps in making sense of the findings. In its original use, the phrase has a consciousness raising function[6]. I use it as an invitation to consider seriously the role of the private, personal sphere in understanding patterns in public and political life. Past work has looked at how gender differences in individual level resources (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995), levels of political knowledge and interest (Verba, Burns and Schlozman, 1997), community norms (Isaksson, Kotsadam and Nerman, 2014), and access to social networks (Prillaman, 2016) shape patterns of women's political participation and representation in various contexts.

[6]Crenshaw (1991) speaks of the "process of recognizing as social and systemic what was formerly perceived as isolated and individual" as key to the practice of identity politics by various marginalized groups.

This paper turns the focus onto the household and the family as a site with unique explanatory power for these outcomes of interest.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature on women's political preferences and participation, and outlines my theory of how these factors interact to produce substantive representation. Section 1.3 describes the study context. Section 1.4 introduces the survey data, and describes the behavioral measure of preference expression. Section 1.5 reports findings on preference heterogeneity within the household, and the results from the behavioral measure. Section 1.6 examines the effects of differences in preferences, and within household empowerment on individuals' choice to express their preferences. Section 1.7 concludes with a discussion of the implications for the link between political participation and representation in gender unequal settings.

## 1.2 Theory and Related Literature

### Preferences

Concerns about gender inequality in politics are in part motivated by the notion of a gender gap in political preferences. In the case of women, this implies that women, as a group, have distinctive preferences that go unheard when women are excluded from the political sphere. In other words, the exclusion of women's voices from politics has material and distributive consequences. The notion of a gender gap in preferences has empirical support across a number of contexts. For instance, work from advanced industrialized democracies demonstrates that women have a greater preference for redistributive and leftist policies than their male counterparts (Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006; Inglehart and Norris, 2000).

It is likely that such gaps, if they exist, will be qualitatively different in the de-

veloping world. For instance, it seems unlikely that women will have strong preferences for redistribution in countries where state capacity is too low to provide comprehensive welfare programs. Accordingly, existing empirical work on gender gaps in preferences in the developing world has focused on differential preferences over locally provided public goods, services, and schemes, rather than programmatic policies. Olken (2010) finds that women in Indonesia are far more likely than men to prefer drinking water projects in their villages, and far less likely to prefer projects involving roads and bridges. Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004)'s seminal study on the effects of village-level quotas for women in India reveals a similar pattern: women in West Bengal and Rajasthan are more likely than men to complain to their village representatives about issues related to water provision, and in Rajasthan, like in Indonesia, they are less likely than men to make requests related to roads. In Sub-Saharan Africa, Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson (2016) analyze Afrobarometer survey data to show that women are more likely than men to prioritize drinking water and poverty alleviation schemes. Brule and Gaikwad (2017) find that women belonging to patrilineal tribes in Meghalaya, India are on average more supportive of public welfare schemes and that unlike men, their support does not decrease when they are reminded of the personal financial burden of such schemes.

How do we reconcile these empirical patterns with the challenge to thinking of women as a homogeneous group with a common set of preferences? Many contemporary feminist and gender studies scholars deemphasize the notion of shared identity and shared interests of women, highlighting instead the heterogeneity of women's experiences (Weldon, 2011). However, Beckwith (2014), while acknowledging the differences of experiences among women, points to the existence of "similar shaping forces" in women's lives that differ substantially from men's lives:

> Women's lives are constructed in specific instances by political, economic, and social arrangements that (1) shape their life histories and life options, and (2) differ substantially from the shaping forces and trajectories of men's lives. This does not mean that all women experience exactly the same lives or are subject to the same constraints or benefit from the same advantages, but it does recognize that, within specific contexts, similar shaping forces exist and have similar consequences for women in a wide range of countries.

I argue that the household division of labor is one such "shaping force" or institution[7]. In particular, the sexual division of labor implies that differential benefits accrue to men and women from universally provided public goods and services and this influences their preferences over these goods. The household division of labor helps us understand the relative preference for water revealed in studies conducted in the Indonesian, Indian and sub-Saharan context where women are largely responsible for the collection of drinking water. Thus, the provision of water, while unarguably beneficial for the entire household and community at large, disproportionately benefits women.

The existing studies discussed above document aggregate gender gaps in preferences for public good and service provision in the developing world. This paper however, provides evidence that such such gaps exist among male and female members *within the same households*. It is thus a more direct test of the notion that conditions within the household, at least in part, drive these preference differences.

I further argue that as a consequence of the gendered division of labor, the roles and tasks performed by men and women within the household are not just different in content, but also different in how they are valued. Specifically, the unpaid work within the home, performed disproportionately by women, is valued lower than than the paid work outside the home, performed disproportionately by men.

[7]Htun (2005) suggests that a conceptualization of gender as a "social position" is useful for political science questions. She suggests that this social position manifests itself in three institutions: the sexual division of labor, normative heterosexuality, and war and militarism and that "these three institutions, [...] position human subjects in unequal and hierarchical relations of power."

Sen (1990) explains this in terms of men and women's "perceived contribution" to the household, which "tends to relate to the size of the direct money earning rather than to the amount of time and effort expended (or to the role of non-market activities by other members of the family, who indirectly support such earnings)." Thus, even if women spend more or equal time and effort on tasks within the household, their work is perceived as a smaller contribution to the household than the paid tasks performed outside the household by men. If the preference gap between men and women within the home arises out of roles that have different values, it is plausible that these preferences too, are valued differently. In particular, women's preferences, borne out of their specific role within the household, may be valued less than the preferences of men.

## Participation and Representation

The bulk of literature on how to achieve the substantive representation of women's distinctive preferences focuses on top-down mechanisms. Specifically it examines how women's participation as leaders may lead to better representation of women's preferences[8]. However scholars have paid less attention to the prospects of bottom-up mechanisms i.e. whether, and under what conditions, women's participation as citizens can improve the substantive representation of their preferences.

Existing evidence on the effects of greater political participation by women, following the extension of suffrage rights in the US and Western Europe, supports the notion that increased participation leads to policy shifts in the direction of women's collective preferences. Lott and Kenny (1999) find that the extension of suffrage through the Nineteenth Amendment in the United States led to increases in welfare spending by state governments, and increased the probability of enactment of

[8]This includes a large body of work on the impacts of women's quotas and the behavior of female legislators (Tripp and Kang, 2008; Htun, 2016; Wängnerud, 2009; Barnes, 2016; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011; Iyer et al., 2012).

prohibition laws, and amendments to divorce laws that benefitted women. Miller (2008) documents an increase in health spending and consequent improvements in children's health following the extension of suffrage. Aidt and Dallal (2008) find similar effects in Western Europe where the extension of suffrage leads to increases in social spending. Carruthers and Wanamaker (2015) find that the Nineteenth Amendment led to greater public resources for education, but that these gains were concentrated in white schools.

Most women living in new democracies in the developing world have never faced a legal barrier to political participation, since universal franchise was enshrined in their country's constitution at the time of independence. Universal suffrage had become an "irresistible norm" by the second half of the twentieth century (Przeworski, 2009), which is when most countries in modern day South Asia, including Pakistan, gained independence.

Equal participation rights may provide women the opportunity to participate and signify their preferences, but we will not observe corresponding shifts in policy if women do not actually exercise these rights in a meaningful way. I argue that the relationship between women's *de jure right* to participate and the *de facto* representation of their preferences depends in part on two factors on the side of women citizens: 1) their actual levels of participation, and 2) whether such participation is reflective of their preferences.

**Levels of Participation**

Following the extension of suffrage, gender gaps in voter turnout still persisted in the developed world, although they have now reversed such that women systematically turn out to vote at higher rates than men in many countries. Lott and Kenny (1999) find that the representational gains from women's suffrage grew overtime as more and more women took advantage of the franchise. The secular trend of

narrowing gender gaps in voter participation also holds in developing democracies. In an analysis of gender gaps in political participation in 20 African countries, Isaksson, Kotsadam and Nerman (2014) find that in 6 countries the gender gap is reversed for voting: women turn out in higher numbers than men. In India, Kapoor and Ravi (2015) document a steady increase in women's turnout in state level elections between 1962 and 2012, and also document a closing of the gender gap in turnout.

However it is worth noting that voting is not the only tool– and is arguably an especially blunt one– for signifying preferences to representatives. Citizens can also engage in various forms of inter-electoral participation, including but not limited to communicating directly with representatives, attending political meetings and rallies, and making campaign contributions. These forms of engagement may have greater influence on representative behavior than voting (Cleary, 2007). Gender gaps in such forms of participation still remain substantial and significant across various contexts. I document similar patterns in Pakistan: the existence of stark gender gaps in levels of political participation of all forms, and particularly wide gaps in inter-electoral participation.

Various scholars have tried to understand why these gaps exist and how to close them. A set of studies shows that the gender gap in individual level factors that are predictive of political participation (e.g. money, time, civic skills, political knowledge and efficacy) has explanatory power for the gender gap in participation (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995; Verba, Burns and Schlozman, 1997). However, emerging research demonstrates that even when accounting for many of these factors, women remain less engaged with politics than similarly situated men. For instance Isaksson, Kotsadam and Nerman (2014) show that norms at the community level hold more explanatory power than individual level factors for women's

under-participation in countries in sub-Saharan Africa[9]. In an extreme example, Gottlieb (2016) finds that a civic education course delivered in Mali raises both men and women's individual levels of political knowledge, but exacerbates the gender gap in actual political participation since female participants are seen as deviating from social norms, and either compensate for this by voluntarily reducing participation, or are prevented by men from participating due to a backlash effect.

**Expression of Preferences**

If women participate at higher rates, can we reasonably expect this to improve the representation of their preferences? We observe a positive relationship between women's participation and their substantive representation in the context of Western developed democracies when women exercise their rights under suffrage. However, I argue that this does not generalize to contexts where women's participation is not reflective of their preferences.

Bleck and Michelitch (2017) examine the case of women's political participation in rural Mali, and suggest that such participation is often *mobilized* (by chiefs or religious leaders) rather than autonomously initiated by women themselves. High rates of female voter turnout are hardly a promising pathway for representation if women are being coerced to turn out. Blaydes and El Tarouty (2009) find that women were more likely to be targeted for vote-buying in the Egyptian parliamentary election of 2005. Using records of village-level meetings in India, Parthasarathy et al. (2017) find that a female-centered poverty alleviation program, which explicitly aims to bring women into greater contact with village government, increases women's attendance and likelihood of speaking up at these meetings. Yet they also

[9]They find that a higher share of men with primary and secondary education is not predictive of male participation levels but is correlated with women's levels of participation. They interpret as this as "Having more people with secondary education is arguably correlated with less traditional gender norms, even if men are the ones being educated."

find that this does not lead to a change in agenda-setting or greater responses to women by the state representatives present at these meetings.

This group of recent studies points to important constraints on part of external actors – village chiefs, religious leaders, political party workers and representatives – which may undermine the relationship between women's political participation and the representation of their preferences. In this paper, I identify an internal constraint: women themselves may be reluctant to express their own distinctive preferences when provided the opportunity to do so.

## 1.3 Context: Gender Inequality in Pakistan

The last nine years represent the longest uninterrupted period of civilian democratic rule in Pakistan's political history since the country gained independence in 1947. The 2013 general elections marked the first civilian transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another, and were deemed by local and international observers to be the freest and fairest elections in the country since 1970. The local body elections held in all four provinces in 2015 marked the first instance of devolution of power under a democratically elected government. Pakistan has made considerable democratic advances in the past few years, however women have arguably been excluded from these gains.

Although it is one of fifty nine countries to have had a female head of state in the last five decades, women's political participation at other levels remains low. On the side of citizen participation, although universal franchise has existed on paper in Pakistan since independence in 1947, the right to vote is unevenly exercised. For one, there is a large and persistent voter registration gap between men and women across all four provinces in Pakistan, with an estimated 11.65 million eligible women excluded from electoral rolls in 2015. Figure 1.1 shows the distri-

bution of this gender gap in voter registration across the two most recent rounds of general elections.

The national level gaps are mirrored at the local level. Figure 1.2 shows the distribution of the gender gap in voter registration across local electoral constituencies in Faisalabad (the district where this study is conducted) in the lead-up to the 2015 local elections.[10].

Figure 1.1: Gender Ratio of Voter Registration in 2 Rounds of General Elections in Pakistan




The severity of the gender gap in registration led the Free and Fair Elections Network in Pakistan to call a "Women Voters Registration Emergency" in the country in 2015. During the 2013 elections, civil society organizations documented multiple instances where women were barred from voting through informal agreements between political parties and male village leaders. Copies of handwritten agreements to this effect, bearing the names of political party candidates, are reproduced in

[10]Unlike the data for voter registration at the national constituency level, data for local elections is not publicly available and was obtained in person from Faisalabad Regional Election Commission, Faisalabad in 2016

Figure 1.2: Gender Ratio of Voter Registration in Local Elections 2015, Faisalabad District




Figure 1.3[11]. Although the examples of explicit bars in the 2013 general elections mostly come from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan, the Punjab Commission on the Status of Women recorded instances of similar restrictions during local elections held in 2015 in the Punjab Province.

The patterns of under-participation are even starker in inter-electoral forms of participation. Although there is no administrative data available on these forms of participation, I measure these gaps through survey questions, and report the results in Section 1.5.

Deep gender inequalities along socioeconomic dimensions co-exist with political inequality in Pakistan. In his seminal article on the phenomenon of missing women in Asia, Sen (1992) notes that Pakistan has the lowest ratio of women to men among large countries, which is indicative of lower access to nutrition and healthcare for women, as well as a systematic preference for sons over daughters.

[11]Source: Aurat Foundation, a civil rights organization which engaged in election monitoring in 2013

Figure 1.3: Handwritten Agreements Barring Women from Turning Out in Constituencies PK-93 and PK-95



The standard indicators of women's empowerment – property/asset ownership, education, and outside employment – are also alarmingly low in Pakistan. Furthermore, an important context-specific factor limits women's opportunities in political and socioeconomic realms: cultural norms of women's mobility and seclusion restrict women's ability to travel unaccompanied or without the permission of a male household member or relative (Jacoby, 2011; Mumtaz and Salway, 2005).

Sen (1992) articulates "participatory political action" by women as a potential way to improving the situation of women's relative deprivation in Asian countries. Indeed, there have been many interventions in Pakistan focused on increasing levels of political participation by women. During my fieldwork, I documented multiple instances of such interventions undertaken during the 2008 and 2013 national elections, including but not limited to voter education campaigns targeted at women run by the Pakistan Election Commission, door-to-door informational campaigns funded by the World Bank (Gine and Mansuri, 2011), and the setup of women's

registration camps by civil society organizations, in partnership with the National Database and Registration Authority (NADRA). Most recently, in anticipation of the 2018 elections, the Pakistan National Assembly has passed a bill which empowers the Pakistan Election Commission to declare elections void if female voter turnout is below a certain threshold:

> If the turnout of women voters is less than ten percent of the total votes polled in a constituency, the Commission may presume that the women voters have been restrained through an agreement from casting their votes and may declare, polling at one or more polling stations or election in the whole constituency, void (Elections Act, 2017)

While improving women's levels of participation is a worthy goal in and of itself, I ask whether such improvement can actually lead to meaningful changes in women's representation.

## 1.4 Data

To study this question, I draw on an original face-to-face survey conducted in 2016 covering 800 households in 16 local administrative units in the district of Faisalabad, located in the Punjab province of Pakistan.

The sampling for the surveys was conducted in 2 stages. First, 10 rural union councils and 6 urban municipal committees (equivalent of union councils for urban areas) were randomly sampled from among the total of 468 administrative units in the district. Each union council or municipal committee contains 6 electoral blocks or wards, 1 block/ward was randomly drawn from each randomly selected union council for surveying. Appendix A.1 reproduces the relevant section from the Punjab Local Government Act 2013 explaining the delimitation of administrative units. In the second stage, 50 households were randomly selected in each electoral ward

to receive a survey, for a total sample of 800 households. The selection rule for households is described in Appendix A.2.

Half of the households in each ward were randomly selected to have a married man as the primary respondent while the other half were randomly selected to have a married woman as the primary respondent. In each household, the spouses of the primary respondent received a short supplementary survey to record demographic characteristics and their preferences over a set of public goods and services, so 1600 individuals were surveyed in total. Surveys were always conducted by an enumerator of the same sex, in keeping with local norms of private interactions with non-family members of the opposite sex.

Table 1.1 below shows a summary of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics for the 800 primary respondents in the sample; Table 1.2 shows the means for the same characteristics among the male and female sample (N=400 each), and p-values from a t-test of difference in means (or proportion, as appropriate) between the two samples:

Table 1.1: Summary Characteristics of Primary Respondents

| | Min | Max | Mean | SD | N |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female | 0 | 1 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 800 |
| Married | 1 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 800 |
| Age | 18 | 50 | 35 | 7.93 | 800 |
| Education Level | 1 | 8 | 3.45 | 2.17 | 800 |
| Employed | 0 | 1 | 0.56 | 0.49 | 800 |
| Monthly HH Income (PKR) | 3,000 | 200,000 | 17,070 | 16,990 | 782 |

Table 1.2: Gender Differences in Summary Characteristics

| | Mean(M) | Mean(F) | Diff | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Age | 36.96 | 32.83 | 4.12 | 0.00 |
| Education Level | 3.18 | 3.09 | 0.09 | 0.002 |
| Employed | 0.97 | 0.16 | 0.81 | 0.00 |
| Monthly HH Income (PKR) | 17,890 | 16,254 | 1,637 | 0.18 |

Notably, the randomly sampled married women in this sample are significantly

younger, less educated and far less likely to be employed than the randomly sampled married men. This reflects national patterns of gender gaps in age at first marriage, educational attainment and employment[12]. Since the question about monthly income relates to the household, rather than individual earnings, there is no significant difference in the numbers reported by men and women.

To measure preferences, enumerators asked all 1600 respondents (800 primary respondents and their spouses) to rank a set of the following 12 local public goods and services:

1. Drinking Water
2. Irrigation Water
3. Sanitation/Waste Management
4. Education
5. Health
6. Job Schemes
7. Roads
8. Electricity
9. Gas
10. Income Support Schemes
11. Transport
12. Security

To guide respondents in the rank ordering process, enumerators used cards with a pictorial representation of each good/service. The picture cards were shuffled by the enumerator before asking the question, so as to avoid the potential for

[12] According to the 2012-13 Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey (PDHS), the average age for first marriage among ever-married women aged 15-49 is 19.5 years, and 24.7 years for ever-married men in the same group. Thus, when randomly selecting among married respondents, it is likely that we would select an overall younger sample of women. For this age group in the nationally representative PDHS sample, 57% of women, and 29% of men have no schooling. The employment rate recorded for women in the PDHS is 29% for women and 98% for men.

the presented order of items to affect the ranking in a systematic way. It may seem intuitive to collapse some of these goods/services by theme for analysis, e.g. transport and roads could be categorized together, as could job and income support schemes. However, in the Pakistani context, these goods/services have particularly gendered patterns of use. In terms of transport, men often use personal bicycles or motorbikes when traveling by road, (72% of households in my sample own either a bicycle or motorbike), but it is not the norm for women to use bicycles or drive motorbikes themselves. Thus, women may have a stake in the quality of public transport even if their household owns a private mode of transport. Collapsing "roads" and "transport" runs the risk of masking this difference. In most contexts income and jobs schemes could potentially be collapsed under a general "livelihoods schemes" category. However in the case of Pakistan, the major state-run cash transfer program (Benazir Income Support Program) is exclusively targeted at women. Thus, respondents may have perceptions about who is more likely to benefit from a an income supplementing scheme, which could drive differential preferences among men and women over this item.

To measure political participation in the survey, enumerators asked direct questions about voter registration status, voting in the last election (2015 local elections), political party membership, and attendance at rallies and community meetings in the past year. Enumerators also asked respondents direct questions about their communication with the following levels of political representatives:

1. Political party worker

2. Union Council Chairman (Local Government, directly elected in 2015)

3. Female Councillor (Local Government, indirectly elected)[13]

[13]At the time of this survey, the new local level female councillors had not been appointed in the Punjab province, despite direct local level elections having taken place nearly a year prior. Given this, there was confusion over how the survey questions related to the female councillor was inter-

4. Member of Provincial Assembly (Provincial Government, directly elected in 2013)

5. Member of National Assembly (National Government, directly elected in 2013)

Since communication with representatives is often driven by a specific need on part of an individual, respondents were also asked about their ability to access these various levels of political representatives, should a need to communicate arise.

## Behavioral Measure of Preference Expression

A goal of the survey is to understand whether men and women express their own preferences when they have an equal opportunity to participate. Since the study is conducted in an inter-electoral period, I focus on an inter-electoral form of participation: communication with a local-level representative. I deploy a behavioral measurement strategy to capture gender gaps in such communication among survey respondents, when the cost of communication is either zero, or artificially equalized across male and female respondents. The measurement strategy proceeds as follows:

All primary respondents are compensated Rs.200($2) for their participation in the survey and then read the following text at the end of the survey:

> Once we have collected the views of a number of households in your area, we will pass on this information to your union council chairman. We will not tell him/her which households we surveyed or what any one individual said, just what most people in the area think. However, we can only take one set of preferences from each household: yours or your spouse's. Your union councilor will not know whether your household gave yours or your spouse's preferences. It is your choice whether we communicate your preferences or your spouse's preferences. Which would you like us to communicate?

preted (e.g. some respondents understood it to mean the former female councillor) Therefore I do not report results for this level of representative

The measure is designed so as to explicitly rule out particular mechanisms that could drive the choice of whose preferences to communicate. First, various costs associated with communication (time, distance, effort) are absorbed by the survey team, therefore insofar as these costs are unequally distributed across men and women, they are equalized to zero in the context of this measurement strategy.

Second, men and women in the same household are interviewed separately, in private, and by an enumerator of the same gender as them. This measurement exercise is only conducted with the primary respondent in a household. Therefore, barring the primary respondent willingly disclosing their choice to their spouse, the choice is private and anonymous. This rules out the possibility that respondents would act out of expectations of their spouse's reaction to their choice.

Third, the respondents are also assured of the anonymity of the preferences they choose to communicate. They are told that their representative will be provided information about constituent preferences in aggregate form, and will not know which individuals' preferences are contained in the aggregate numbers. This accounts for concerns that respondents would make their choice based on whether they think their local representative is more/less likely to respond to preferences based on the gender, or other identifiable characteristics of the individual who is communicating with them. This is likely to be a more salient constraint for women who, as anecdotal evidence reveals, are in fact devalued as informants about public goods and services by representatives.

Finally the measure forces equal levels communication of preferences.The choice available to the respondent is whether to communicate their own preferences or their spouses'. What this measure then captures is men and women's willingness to assert their own preferences, when the nominal level of participation is held equal.

In addition, I also measure the sensitivity of the respondent's choice to a mon-

etary cost. Respondents are assigned to one of three conditions:

- **Control**: It is your choice whether we communicate your preferences or your spouse's preferences.
- **T1**: It is your choice whether we communicate your preferences or your spouse's preferences. However, if you want us to communicate your own, it will cost Rs.50 from the Rs.200 that we gave you earlier. If you want to communicate your spouse's we will do that for no cost.
- **T2**: It is your choice whether we communicate your preferences or your spouse's preferences. However, if you want us to communicate your spouse's, it will cost Rs.50 from the Rs.200 that we gave you earlier. If you want to communicate your own we will do that for no cost.

These cost treatments are intended to measure how malleable the patterns of preference expression are among men and women, and whether they are responsive to monetary incentives. Treatment 1 reflects an extreme scenario where communicating one's own preferences is more costly than communicating someone else's (in this case one's spouse's) preferences. Treatment 2 reflects the more "realistic" condition where communicating someone's else's (in this case one's spouse's) preferences is relatively costly: ostensibly it is more costly to communicate someone else's preferences over one's own, as it involves the time and effort of getting to know (or even guessing) those preferences.

## 1.5 Results

### Gender Gaps in Preferences (Survey Measure)

Do men and women have different preferences over public good service provision? Previous work has found evidence of aggregate gender gaps in such preferences

in the developing world (Olken, 2010; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson, 2016). However, these studies have not tested whether these gendered preference gaps also exist within the same household. The "homophily principle"(McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook, 2001) suggests that similarity on various demographic, socioeconomic, attitudinal and behavioral characteristics structures people's social network ties (including marriage). If we think that men and women may select into marriage based on similar preferences, or other characteristics that shape these preferences, we may see that the preference differences that exist between men and women in the aggregate are smaller, or non-existent within married couples. On the other hand, if it is conditions within the household – specifically the division of roles and labor within the household – that shape these preferences, then we should see the aggregate level differences reflected within the household.

To test whether there is indeed preference heterogeneity within the household, I pool the data on rankings of public goods and services from 800 primary respondents and their spouses (N=1600) and estimate a series of 12 seemingly unrelated OLS regressions (SUR) where the dependent variable in each model is the the rank given to 1 of 12 goods or services by a respondent in a household[14]. The right hand side variables include a dummy variable indicating whether respondent is a female, and household fixed effects. The addition of household fixed effects means that the coefficient on the female dummy variable captures the within-household effect of being female on the rank given to a particular good. Figure 1.4 below plots the estimated coefficients on the female dummy variable from the 12 models. Note that a lower rank means a higher priority; ranking something as number one means that the respondent prefers it the most among the set of goods. Thus, negative co-

[14]I follow the approach in Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson (2016) of using the SUR setup to allow for correlation of errors across the equations, which I expect will exist since the rank given to any one good/service depends on the rank given to the others

efficients imply that women are more likely to prefer a particular good.

Figure 1.4: Estimated Effect of Gender on Preferences for Local Public Goods and Service




The results are in line with the patterns of aggregate gender differences from studies in Indonesia, India and sub-Saharan Africa. Women give significantly lower ranks to (have a greater preference for) healthcare, drinking water, and income generation schemes, and higher ranks (have a lower preference) for roads and transport than the men in the same household. This analysis provides the first empirical test demonstrating that previously documented aggregate level differences also exist within the household.

Previous studies have suggested that the household division of labor shapes gender gaps in preferences. Women in these study contexts are responsible for water collection and likely to benefit disproportionately from its provision. On the other hand, men are more likely to travel by road for work, and likely to benefit disproportionately from infrastructure improvement. In a separate piece (Khan, 2017*b*), I explore why the specific mechanisms driving women's relatively higher preference for water is different in the context of this particular district in Pakistan. Here, many households in the survey sample receive a piped water supply, and

gendered norms of mobility dictate that it is actually more often men who collect water when it is required. Interviews with community organizers suggest that women's relative preference for drinking water arises out of a concern for children's waterborne illnesses, which are ubiquitous, and a leading cause of child mortality in this context. Women's relative support for income generation schemes, may be driven by a higher preference for redistribution which also exists in other contexts Brule and Gaikwad (2017). However, in the case of Pakistan, the major state-run cash-transfer program (Benazir Income Support Program) is targeted at women, therefore the preference in this case could potentially be driven by women seeing themselves as the likely beneficiaries of an income supplementing scheme. Similarly, women's lower preference for roads may be related, as in other contexts, to the fact that women are less likely to travel by road for work than are men due to differential labor force participation rates. However, the added context-specific restrictions on women's mobility mean that women in this context are less likely to travel by road than men, not just for work, but for any reason at all (Jacoby, 2011; Mumtaz and Salway, 2005).

The household division of labor may exist across contexts as a "shaping force"(Beckwith, 2014) or an "institution"(Htun, 2005) that informs men and women's lived experiences and preferences, but it also interacts with other contextual factors. An observationally equivalent difference in preferences across contexts may in fact be driven by different facets of the context-specific household division of labor, and its interaction with local norms.

## Gender Gaps in Levels of Participation (Survey Measures)

Having established that men and women have systematically different preferences and priorities, I now turn to the question of whether they participate at different rates in the political sphere. Table 1.3 shows the proportion of male and female

respondents responding "yes" to various self-reported measures of electoral and inter-electoral participation. Column 3 shows the gender difference in proportions, and Column 4 shows the p-value from a two-sample t-test of difference in proportions.

Table 1.3: Gender Gaps in Electoral and Inter-electoral Participation in Survey Sample

| Measure | Prop(M) | Prop(F) | Diff | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Electoral and Inter-Electoral Participation | | | | |
| Registered to Voted | 0.95 | 0.72 | 0.22 | 0.00 |
| Voted in 2015 | 0.89 | 0.67 | 0.22 | 0.00 |
| Attended rally (Past Year) | 0.19 | 0.04 | 0.14 | 0.00 |
| Attended community meeting (Past Year) | 0.30 | 0.06 | 0.24 | 0.00 |
| Member of political party | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.02 |
| Contact with Representatives in Last Year | | | | |
| Contacted Party Worker | 0.04 | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.70 |
| Contacted UC Chair | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Contacted MPA | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Contacted MNA | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Access to Representatives | | | | |
| Can access Party Worker | 0.67 | 0.44 | 0.23 | 0.00 |
| Can access UC Chair | 0.80 | 0.60 | 0.20 | 0.00 |
| Can access MPA | 0.43 | 0.21 | 0.22 | 0.00 |
| Can access MNA | 0.39 | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0.00 |

Notably, there is a substantially large and statistically significant gap across all measures. The usual caveats about self-reported turnout apply to the proportions who report voting in the 2015 local election, but the gap between men and women in this measure is still meaningful. Contact and communication with one's representatives is an important tool for accountability. In particular, one of the rationales for decentralization is its potential to allows increased access to a lower level of representative. Respondents in the survey do in fact report higher levels of access to their local union council chairman than to their provincial or national representative. However, despite a majority respondents knowing their union council chairperson either directly or indirectly, a very small proportion report having ap-

proached him/her in the past year to "get something done" or "solve a problem." Moreover, the gender gaps in such contact are substantial.

Starker still are the gender gaps in access to representatives. The question about access was phrased liberally to ask about whether the respondent could access representative either personally, or through someone in their household. Given that it was random as to whether a household had a primary female or male respondent, we should not expect systematic differences in access at the household level. The lower reports of access by women respondents suggest that not only are women less likely to have direct access to representatives, they may not even have knowledge of the indirect access they potentially enjoy through other household members [15].

If systematically fewer women are contacting and communicating with their representatives, it implies that their voices and opinions are likely to be absent from decision-making. In the Pakistani rural context, communication is also sometimes initiated by representatives themselves in the form of informal town-halls held prior to elections, (these are the "community meetings" referred to in 1.3), but women are dismally absent from such processes. This exclusion partly reflects a perception that women are less likely to be informed about services and community needs; a former councillor stated in an an interview "Women are usually inside so they know less about these things" [16]. However, women's opinions may be discounted, even with regards to the realms of planning in which their interior positionality in the household provides them with specialized knowledge. In another interview with a male civil society organizer whose organization conducts trainings for newly inducted local councillors, the interviewee stated: "When I built my house, I didn't ask my wife where to put the fan in the kitchen. If I had asked

[15] An alternative interpretation is that men are greatly overstating access to signal higher status and connectedness to an enumerator. However if we take this seriously, more men ought to be saying they are connected to higher levels of representatives, which does not bear out in the data

[16] Author Interview, 2016

her I would have known not to put it where I did. This is the state of women's representation in local planning"[17].

The absence of women's voices in the political sphere is a serious problem, but these anecdotes point to a different obstacle: women's voices may not be taken seriously by representatives even when they are present. This is in line with the pattern documented in a recent study by Parthasarathy et al. (2017), who find that despite increased participation by women in village councils in India, there are no impacts on agenda setting or responsiveness from the representatives present at council meetings. Importantly, it is unreasonable to expect that women are unaware of this dismissal of their voices. Rather, this may negatively influence their willingness to participate at all, and their expectations of the gains from doing so. A thorough exploration of constraints to representation on part of external actors (specifically representatives) is outside the scope of this paper. In the next section, I turn to another constraint which may limit the gains from women's participation: women's own reticence to assert their distinctive preferences when they participate.

## Gender Gaps in Preference Expression (Behavioral Measure)

Primary respondents in the survey sample are asked to rank a set of public goods and services and then asked to choose whether they would like their own, or their spouse's preferences to be communicated to their local representative. Given the low baseline levels of communication between respondents and their representatives reported in the survey, this is a unique opportunity. Respondents are assured that their choice is private and anonymous. Communication of some sort is guaranteed in this exercise: a set of preferences will be communicated, it is simply up to the respondent to choose whose preferences ought to be communicated. Figure 1.5 shows the proportion of respondents that choose to communicate their own pref-

[17] Author Interview, 2016

erences across each of the 3 cost conditions. The control represents the condition where there is no cost, T1 represents the condition where communicating one's own preferences is relatively costly (it involves giving up 25% of the survey sitting fee), T2 represents the condition where communicating one's spouse's preferences is relatively costly (it involves giving up 25% of the survey sitting fee).

Figure 1.5: Proportion of Respondents Choosing to Communicate Own Preferences Across Cost Conditions, by Gender




The stark gender gap in the control condition is the core finding of this paper. In this condition, most men choose to communicate their own preferences, and the trend is exactly reversed for women, most of whom choose to communicate their spouse's preferences. This is consistent with multiple explanations that could drive individuals' choice under conditions of privacy and anonymity. Greater altruism or other-regarding preferences on part of women may make them more likely to forego the opportunity to communicate their own preferences, in favor of communicating someone else's (in this case their spouse's). In their review of existing evidence on gender differences in altruism Croson and Gneezy (2009) determine that the evidence on other-regarding preferences is inconclusive; what emerges instead is that women are more sensitive to the social context of experiments than men. It is

difficult to parse this out within the context of a single study where the experimental context is not varied. The results may also reflect a gendered difference in the preference for exercising agency. In a lab experimental setting in Pakistan, Afzal et al. (2016) find that women subjects are less willing to forego a material payoff to guarantee their own choice in the context of a low-stakes consumption choice. They interpret this as a "low demand for agency" on part of women, stemming from them having internalized a subordinate position within the household. Finally, as I will argue, women's unwillingness to communicate their own preferences could reflect a lower value placed on the preferences themselves

Women and men also respond differently to the cost treatments. In the case of Treatment 1, where it is relatively costly to communicate one's own preferences, the gender gap is no longer significant. Less than a quarter of all respondents are willing to give up Rs.50 to communicate their own preferences over their spouses. In Treatment 2, where it is relatively costly to communicate one's spouse's preferences, the gender gap remains. Hardly any men are willing to give up Rs.50 to communicate their spouse's preferences in place of their own, but nearly 20% of women are willing to do so.

I estimate the following model (with ward fixed effects) to capture the gender differences in choice, and the differential sensitivity of this choice to the two cost treatments. Figure 1.6 displays the conditional coefficients on Treatment 1 and 2 by gender, and Table 1.4, columns 1 and 2 show the corresponding regression results:

$$\text{Choice}_{i,j} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Female}_i + \beta_2 \text{T1}_i + \beta_3 \text{T2}_i + \beta_4 (\text{Female*T1})_i + \beta_5 (\text{Female*T2})_i + \beta_6 \text{Ward}_j + \epsilon$$

The coefficient on T1 is significantly smaller for women than it is for men. There are multiple possible interpretations for this differential sensitivity to the treatment. First, the effect of an additional cost on communicating one's own preferences may

Figure 1.6: Estimated Effect of Cost Treatments on Choice to Communicate Own Preferences, by Gender




be smaller for women due to floor effects – so few women choose to communicate their own preferences to begin with, that the added cost does not have the potential to change their overall behavior by very much. On the other hand, men are highly sensitive to the treatment, and most are willing to give up the opportunity to communicate their own preferences in favor of their spouses when it is costly to do so. Given that costs of communication for men in the real world (in terms of mobility and access to representatives) might be lower than those for women, their behavior in response to this treatment suggests that they could potentially be incentivized to communicate women's preferences to representatives. This is reflective of how women actually access representatives indirectly in the everyday. In the survey I also ask men and women about who they would approach if faced with various problems related to local public good and service provision. For instance, I ask respondents about who they would approach if if there was no female doctor at their local Basic Healthcare Unit (BHU). 44% of men say they would directly approach their local councillor, and only 13% say they would first approach their spouse. Meanwhile only 15% of women say they would directly approach

their local councillor, and 38% say they would first approach their spouse. This is especially striking given that the problem in question, that of a female doctor, is ostensibly one that disproportionately affects women.

On the other hand, the coefficient on T2 is significantly larger for women than it is for men. Again, this may reflect a ceiling effect for men: so few men choose to communicate their spouse's preferences to begin with, that an additional cost to doing so cannot discourage a much larger proportion from doing so. In the case of women, on the one hand the jump in the proportion willing to communicate their own preferences in response to the cost treatment is striking. Equally striking though is that a significant proportion of women (nearly 20%) are willing to give up Rs.50 to assert their spouse's preferences in place of their own.

One way to interpret the relative sensitivities to the treatments is by thinking of the population of survey respondents as comprised of 3 types of individuals: those who will *always* assert their own preferences over their own spouses regardless of cost, those who will do so only when incentivized, and those who will never do so. The gender gaps are indicative that there is a significantly higher proportion of the first type (those who always assert) among men, and of the third type (those who never assert) among women.

In addition, I pool the two cost treatments and test whether the gender gap persists when there is *any* cost imposed on communication, regardless of whether the cost is attached to communicating one's own or one's spouse's preferences. I find that women are significantly less likely to communicate their own preferences. Figure 1.7 shows the difference in means across men and women choosing to communicate their own preferences in the control and in the pooled cost treatment conditions, and the results from regression models pooling the two cost treatments are shown in Table 1.4, columns 3 and 4.

Figure 1.7: Proportion of Respondents Choosing to Communicate Own Preferences Across Cost Conditions, by Gender




## 1.6 Further Analysis

What makes men and women more or less likely to assert their preferences? In this section I analyze how the choice to assert one's own preferences is shaped by various factors.

### Preference Differences

If individuals behave in a self-interested way, they ought to be particularly concerned about asserting their own preferences when these preferences are substantially different from the alternative (in this case, the spouse's preferences). To test this, I look at whether the choice made by respondents is sensitive to how different they *think* their own preferences are from their spouse's preferences. I measure this perception using a 4 point scale (0: No difference to 4: Completely Different). I also measure the actual difference in preferences using a Euclidean distance measure of difference in ranks accorded to different public goods and services by respondents and their spouses. I then estimate the following model:

Table 1.4: Effect of Cost Treatments on Choice to Communicate Own Preferences, OLS Models

| | *Dependent variable:* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Choose to Communicate Own Preferences=1 | | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Female | $-0.296^{***}$ | $-0.640^{***}$ | $-0.297^{***}$ | $-0.640^{***}$ |
| | (0.026) | (0.042) | (0.034) | (0.057) |
| T1 | $-0.421^{***}$ | $-0.690^{***}$ | | |
| | (0.032) | (0.042) | | |
| T2 | $0.326^{***}$ | $0.081^{*}$ | | |
| | (0.032) | (0.042) | | |
| Pooled Treatment | | | $-0.048$ | $-0.305^{***}$ |
| | | | (0.036) | (0.049) |
| Female*T1 | | $0.539^{***}$ | | |
| | | (0.060) | | |
| Female*T2 | | $0.491^{***}$ | | |
| | | (0.060) | | |
| Female*PooledT | | | | $0.514^{***}$ |
| | | | | (0.069) |
| Constant | $0.627^{***}$ | $0.804^{***}$ | $0.621^{***}$ | $0.797^{***}$ |
| | (0.056) | (0.056) | (0.073) | (0.075) |
| Ward FE? | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 800 | 800 | 800 | 800 |
| $R^2$ | 0.479 | 0.538 | 0.106 | 0.165 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.467 | 0.526 | 0.087 | 0.146 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.365 (df = 781) | 0.344 (df = 779) | 0.477 (df = 782) | 0.462 (df = 781) |
| F Statistic | $39.816^{***}$ (df = 18; 781) | $45.367^{***}$ (df = 20; 779) | $5.462^{***}$ (df = 17; 782) | $8.575^{***}$ (df = 18; 781) |
| *Note:* | | | | $^{*}$p<0.1; $^{**}$p<0.05; $^{***}$p<0.01 |

$$\text{Choice}_{i,j} = \alpha + \beta_1 \text{Female}_i + \beta_2 \text{T1}_i + \beta_3 \text{T2}_i + \beta_4 \text{PerceivedDiff}_i + \beta_5 \text{ActualDiff}_i + \beta_6 (\text{Female*PerceivedDiff})_i + \beta_7 (\text{Female*ActualDiff})_i + \beta_8 \text{Ward}_j + \epsilon$$

Figure 1.8 displays the conditional coefficients on gender, by perceived and actual differences in preferences. Counter to a logic of self interest, women's willingness to communicate their own preferences in fact *decreases* in how different they perceive their preferences as being, and in how different they actually are. Table 1.5 reports the corresponding regression results:

This finding has grave implications for the prospects of women's representation. A

Figure 1.8: Estimated Effect of Gender on Choice to Communicate Own Preferences, by Perceived and Actual Distance from Preferences of Spouse




difference in men and women's willingness to assert their own preferences would not have distributional consequences if they were communicating the same content at the end of the day. However, this pattern suggests that women are least willing to make their preferences known to representatives when it matters the most, i.e. when they are substantively different.

Explanations of an overall "low demand for agency" (Afzal et al., 2016) cannot explain why women would be especially unwilling to assert their preferences when they see those preferences as distinct. This pattern is more consistent with women systematically undervaluing the *content* of their preferences.

The pattern is also consistent with a logic of what constitutes "appropriate" behavior for women. For instance, it may be "appropriate" for women to speak up within the household, only as long as it is to voice agreement. In my survey, I ask respondents whether they would feel comfortable expressing their preference about a political candidate if their preferences from different from other members of the household. 78% of men say yes, while only 53% of women do. These results imply that women's unwillingness to express a dissenting view on political issues

within the household potentially extends to environments outside the household. Women are reticent to express a dissenting view from their spouse even when their choice to do so is completely confidential, and the audience for their preferences is not other household members, but rather a political representative.

Table 1.5: Effect of Actual and Perceived Preference Differences on Choice to Communicate Own Preferences, OLS Models

| | *Dependent variable:* | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | Choose to Communicate Own Preferences=1 | | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Female | $-0.174^{***}$ | $-0.174^{**}$ | $-0.052$ |
| | (0.049) | (0.082) | (0.092) |
| Perceived Diff. | 0.039 | | 0.035 |
| | (0.032) | | (0.032) |
| Actual Diff. | | $0.019^{**}$ | $0.018^{**}$ |
| | | (0.009) | (0.009) |
| Female*PerceivedDiff | $-0.134^{***}$ | | $-0.129^{***}$ |
| | (0.046) | | (0.046) |
| Female*ActualDiff | | $-0.020$ | $-0.021^{*}$ |
| | | (0.012) | (0.012) |
| Constant | $0.591^{***}$ | $0.524^{***}$ | $0.496^{***}$ |
| | (0.061) | (0.073) | (0.076) |
| Ward FE? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cost Treatment 1? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Cost Treatment 2? | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 800 | 800 | 800 |
| $R^2$ | 0.485 | 0.482 | 0.488 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.471 | 0.469 | 0.473 |
| Residual Std. Error | 0.363 (df = 779) | 0.364 (df = 779) | 0.363 (df = 777) |
| F Statistic | $36.639^{***}$ (df = 20; 779) | $36.217^{***}$ (df = 20; 779) | $33.616^{***}$ (df = 22; 777) |
| *Note:* | | | $^{*}$p<0.1; $^{**}$p<0.05; $^{***}$p<0.01 |

## Empowerment Within the Household

If women's lower willingness to assert their preferences is borne out of a subordinate position in the household, then greater empowerment within the household should be related to greater willingness to assert preferences. This may of course, also hold true for men. To the extent, that their greater willingness to assert preferences is borne out of a superior position within the household, we may expect that factors that predict such empowerment make men all the more likely to assert their own preferences. For this analysis, I split the sample into men and women and analyze how within-household empowerment affects their choice of preference expression. To measure within-household empowerment, I construct an index of variables that are generally deemed to be predictive or reflective of empowerment.

### Spousal Age Difference

Early marriage and spousal age difference has been shown to be predictive, especially in the South Asian context, of poorer health outcomes for women, and a greater risk for intimate partner violence (Kishor and Gupta, 2009). As such, a large age difference, where the the woman is younger than her spouse may be reflective of a power differential within the household favoring the man.

### Spousal Education Difference

Education in its own right may influence the value women place on their own preferences. Anecdotal information suggests that external actors devalue women's preferences because they see women as less informed about matters outside the home. This is not entirely false: women do report watching less political news, and reading the newspaper less often. Women may devalue their own preferences because they see themselves as less informed. However, a woman's individual level of education may be less important for her status within the household than her

education *relative* to her spouse. A woman with a certain level of education may still defer to her spouse if he is more educated than her. While I control for individual education in analysis, I only include spousal education difference in the empowerment index.

**Employment Outside the Home**

There are significant differences in the levels of employment among men and women in the sample (see Table 1.2). However, even among women who work, many work within the home, while nearly all employed men who work outside the home. Sen (1992) describes various channels through which employment outside the home can affect women's status within the home:

> First, outside employment for wages can provide women with an income to which they have easier access, and it can also serve as a means of making a living on which women can rely, making them less vulnerable. Second, the social respect that is associated with being a "bread winner" (and a "productive" contributor to the family's joint prosperity) can improve women's status and standing in the family, and may influence the prevailing cultural traditions regarding who gets what in the division of joint benefits. Third, when outside employment takes the form of jobs with some security and legal protection, the corresponding rights that women get can make their economic position much less vulnerable and precarious. Fourth, working outside the home also provides experience of the outside world, and this can be socially important in improving women's position within the family. In this respect outside work may be "educational" as well.

**Decision-making Power**

Many scholars emphasize the element of agency and the ability to make strategic decisions as a key part of empowerment (Kabeer, 1999). As part of the survey, I measure whether men and women are either the primary or joint decision-makers over a set of household decisions relating to everyday household purchases, ma-

jor household purchases and decisions about seeking healthcare (whether to see a doctor, and which doctor to see).

The index is a weighted average of each of these variables. I use the inverse covariance weighting method which optimizes information content from variables that are considered to be related *a priori* by up-weighting variables that provide "new" information (Anderson, 2008). Figure 1.9 shows how this index is distributed among male and female respondents. Unsurprisingly, men are, on average, far more "empowered" than women.

Figure 1.9: Household Empowerment Index, by Gender




**Gender Equitable Attitudes**

I also test whether individuals' communication choices are related to gender equitable attitudes. To measure this, I include a predictor of gender equitable attitudes on an ostensibly unrelated topic: whether respondents think household chores are solely a woman's responsibility. The responses are coded on a 4 point scale (0: Completely Agree to 4: Completely Disagree) where a higher number indicates a more equitable attitude. I expect that respondents with more gender equitable attitudes towards women may be more likely to communicate women's preferences (for men, this means their spouse's preferences, for women this means their own preferences).

Table 1.6 shows results from the following model, run separately for men and women. All variables are standardized for ease of interpretation.

$$\begin{aligned}\text{Choice}_{i,j} = \alpha &+ \beta_1 \text{Age}_i + \beta_2 \text{Education}_i + \beta_3 \text{HH Empowerment}_i \\ &+ \beta_4 \text{Equitable Attitude}_i + \beta_5 \text{Perceived Diff.}_i + \beta_6 \text{Actual Diff.}_i \\ &+ \beta_7 \text{T1}_i + \beta_8 \text{T2}_i + \beta_9 \text{Ward}_j + \epsilon\end{aligned}$$

Household empowerment is positively related with women's willingness to assert their own preferences. Importantly, education levels and age at the individual level do not predict women's choices. There is something about the *relative* position in the household that is key for women's preference expression. The gains from household empowerment for women are similar in size to the negative effect of perceived difference of preferences. These results suggest both that an inferior status within the household may constrain women's assertion of their preferences and that household empowerment may indeed be a promising pathway for women's preference assertion, However, there is no similar relationship for men. One explanation for this is that the index is constructed of factors generally thought to predict *women's* household empowerment. It is possible that men's position within the household, and their preference assertion, is determined by other factors not captured by this index. Another possibility is ceiling effects: men are simply far more likely to communicate their preferences on average, and there is lower variation in their levels of empowerment as measured by this index. However, men's willingness to communicate their own preferences over their spouses is decreasing in gender equitable attitudes: men who believe that women are not solely responsible for household chores are more likely to communicate their spouse's preferences in this behavioral measure. This is consistent with men valuing women's preferences over public goods and services more if they do not think of women's role in

Table 1.6: Effect of Household Empowerment on Choice to Communicate Own Preferences, OLS Models

| | *Dependent variable:* | |
|---|---|---|
| | Choose to Communicate Own Preferences=1 | |
| | (1) | (2) |
| Age | −0.010 | −0.003 |
| | (0.018) | (0.021) |
| Education | −0.003 | 0.024 |
| | (0.018) | (0.020) |
| HH Empowerment | 0.021 | 0.057** |
| | (0.022) | (0.028) |
| Equitable Attitude | −0.030* | 0.014 |
| | (0.015) | (0.022) |
| Perceived Diff. | 0.019 | −0.056*** |
| | (0.016) | (0.020) |
| Actual Diff. | 0.035** | −0.007 |
| | (0.016) | (0.020) |
| Constant | 0.896*** | 0.152* |
| | (0.071) | (0.080) |
| Settlement FE? | Yes | Yes |
| Cost Treatment1? | Yes | Yes |
| Cost Treatment2? | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 400 | 400 |
| $R^2$ | 0.579 | 0.490 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.553 | 0.459 |
| Residual Std. Error (df = 376) | 0.313 | 0.357 |
| F Statistic (df = 23; 376) | 22.444*** | 15.730*** |
| *Note:* | | *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 |

the household as confined to housework.

## 1.7 Discussion

There are well-documented gender inequalities in levels of political participation around the world. These gaps are particularly stark in Pakistan, where women are missing from electoral rolls in large numbers, face informal bans from turning out

to vote, report negligible levels of contact with their representatives, and enjoy at best low levels of indirect access to local levels of government. In this paper, I first show that the exclusion of women's voices from the political sphere has potential material and distributive consequences. Women hold systematically different preferences over what goods and services they want to see provided in their communities. These preferences are rooted in a gendered division of labor which implies that certain goods and services – such as drinking water – provide them disproportionate benefits. The heterogeneity of preferences between men and women is observable within households.

Past and planned interventions by external actors working for democracy promotion, and policy measures undertaken by the Pakistani state are directed towards improving the level of women's participation and bringing it on par with that of men. While achieving equality in political participation among men and women is a worthy goal, I argue that it is not sufficient to guarantee the representation of women's preferences in the political sphere. Even when they engage in acts of participation, women may be held back from asserting their own preferences. Using a behavioral measure of participation I show that when men and women are given an equal opportunity to communicate their demands to their representative, they use this opportunity in markedly different ways. Men use it to assert their own preferences, while women use it to forward the preferences of their spouses. Moreover, women are especially unwilling to assert their own preferences when they perceive these preferences as being distinctive from their spouse, which is consistent with a logic of systematic undervaluation of their preferences.

Ultimately, this finding challenges the theoretical relationship between women's political participation and the substantive representation of their preferences and interests. Evidence from Western industrialized democracies shows that policies shift in the direction of women's preferences when women are extended the right

to participate in politics. My results demonstrate that this is unlikely to be true in contexts where extreme gender inequality at the level of the household precludes women from expressing distinctive preferences within the household, and from using their legal rights to act on their distinctive preferences outside of it.

The purpose of highlighting the limited representational gains from women's participation is by no means to undermine the importance of equal rights to political participation. Rather it is to draw attention to the deep implications of inequality in the household, a sphere which is often overlooked in mainstream theories of democratic politics. Okin (1989) notes this oversight within contemporary political philosophy and 20th century theories of justice: the question of how "disparity within the family" shapes prospects for social and political equality more broadly has received little attention. This paper attempts to correct for that oversight. The findings demonstrate that, especially in the case of women, the household serves as an important mediator between citizens and the state, and that ignoring it, either in analysis, or in the design of policy, runs the risk of doing the subjects of the analysis and the intended targets of the policies a disservice.

Chapter 2

# Canvassing the Gatekeepers: *A Field Experiment to Increase Women's Electoral Turnout**

With Ali Cheema[†], Asad Liaqat[‡] and Shandana Khan Mohmand[§]

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# Abstract

Pakistan has one of the largest gender gaps in turnout among electoral democracies around the world. A widely tested strategy to encourage turnout in a variety of contexts is door-to-door voter canvassing or mobilization. We use a field experiment conducted with 2500 households in the city of Lahore to study the effectiveness of this strategy in increasing women's turnout in the 2018 Pakistan General Election. We find that non-partisan mobilization only improves women's turnout when mobilizers target men in households, and that targeting women alone is insufficient to effect changes in women's political participation on Election Day. Using a costly behavioral measure of support for women's role in democracy, we find that targeting men with the mobilization treatment increases their expressed support for women's role in democracy beyond Election Day. Results from a post-election survey suggest that households where both men and women received the treatment saw greater political discussion among men and women, and that men provided women in these households with logistical support to vote on Election Day. These findings have theoretical implications for understanding women's political participation in a context where they enjoy limited agency within the household, and practical implications for designing effective interventions to improve their participation under such conditions.

## 2.1 Introduction

Although women enjoy the *de jure* right to vote and participate in politics around the world, *de facto* inequalities in political participation between men and women persist in many democratic polities. Closing the gender gap in political participation is not just normatively desirable, it also has potential consequences for the distribution of resources and content of policy. Existing empirical evidence shows that across a variety of contexts women hold systematically different preferences from men over welfare policy, and what public goods and services they want to see provided in their communities (Brule and Gaikwad, 2017; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Olken, 2010; Gottlieb, Grossman and Robinson, 2016; Inglehart and Norris, 2000; Iversen and Rosenbluth, 2006; Khan, 2017*a*). Evidence from the US and Western Europe following the extension of suffrage suggests that when women participate in higher numbers as voters, policy shifts in line with their distinctive preferences follow suit (Carruthers and Wanamaker, 2015; Lott and Kenny, 1999; Miller, 2008). The flip side of this is that if women systematically under participate, their preferences risk going unheard and unrepresented. This is a particularly salient concern in Pakistan: among the countries surveyed in the most recent wave of the World Values Survey, Pakistan has the largest gender gap (19.5%) in self-reported voter turnout.

In this study, we investigate how to close the gender gap in political participation in a "difficult" setting, and how to increase participation among a group (women) that has a history of low participation. The setting is one where there is a gender gap in baseline levels of partisan mobilization and women are overwhelmingly excluded from political networks. In a focus group in one of our study constituencies, a participant stated: "no one talks to women when it comes to asking for

votes, all the talk is for men[2]." We explore whether it is possible to improve women's participation without changing the structure of political networks, or radically altering the incentives and resources of parties to target women at greater rates.

We use a field experiment conducted across 2500 households in 500 wards (local administrative unit) in the city of Lahore in partnership with civic mobilizers to study whether a non-partisan mobilization campaign can boost women's participation in the 2018 General Elections in Pakistan. The mobilization visits are randomly targeted to either exclusively women (T1), exclusively men (T2), or both women and men (T3) in treatment households allowing us to explore whether targeting the mobilization at men within households (who enjoy greater decision-making power, and may be involved in the decision of whether women participate) can improve women's participation in these households. We look at outcomes of voter turnout among members of our study households, visually verified by enumerators in the days immediately following the General Election using the indelible ink marks placed on voters' thumbs. We find no effects of the mobilization campaign on men's turnout. The campaign also does not appear to affect women's turnout in households where it is targeted only at women. We find weakly positive effects of the intervention on women's turnout at the household level, when it is targeted at only men. We see positive and significant effects of the campaign on the turnout of women at the individual and household level when the campaign is targeted to both men and women in a household. The household level effects are robust to corrections for attrition.

Results from an endline survey administered roughly two months after the General Election show no evidence that the mobilization campaign had lasting effects on women's political knowledge, interest in politics or sense of political self-efficacy. Neither did it result in a change in the perceived descriptive norms around

[2]FGD 10, Lahore 01/24/2018

women's political participation. We do however find strong evidence that in households where the mobilization was targeted at both men and women (T3), men and women were significantly more likely to report discussing politics with each other. Furthermore, both men and women in these household reported that men provided logistical support to women on Election Day so that they could vote.

The positive effect on men's behavior lasts beyond the election. Two months after the Election, as part of the endline survey, we offer men in our sample households the option to post a sticker on the entry-way to their residence. Male respondents are randomized into receiving a sticker with a pro-democracy slogan, or a sticker with a pro-democracy slogan along with a slogan endorsing women's essential role in a strong democracy. Men in the control group are 5 percentage points less likely to accept a sticker endorsing women's political participation compared to a general pro-democracy sticker, but this differential is fully alleviated for men in the households where both men and women were mobilized prior to the election.

These findings contribute to a broader research agenda on the effectiveness of different strategies and appeals to boost political participation, and on what motivates individuals to vote. While much of our knowledge on this subject comes from studies conducted around US elections, we ask these questions in a still-consolidating developing democracy with higher levels of gender inequality on various dimensions. The particular context has meaningful implications both for i) what types of strategies we can reasonably test, e.g. using written materials for voter education/motivation has less potential in a setting with a large illiterate population, and ii) what types of strategies we expect to be effective e.g. a stark finding from the US is that social pressure is particularly effective in increasing turnout (Gerber, Green and Larimer, 2008; Rogers, Goldstein and Fox, Forthcoming), however it is unclear that "being seen as a voter" by others would be effective in moti-

vating women to turnout in a context where visible participation in public space is not the norm and may in fact risk stigmatization.

## 2.2 Background & Context

### Relevant Literature

The question of how to close the gender gap in political participation is of course tied to what constrains women's participation in the first place. One set of explanations focuses on the importance of resources, broadly conceived, in explaining individuals' participation (Brady, Verba and Schlozman, 1995). People need certain resources (time, money, information, skills) to participate in politics and insofar as these resources are unequally distributed across men and women, they may explain the observed gender gaps in participation. There is some evidence that targeting such resource constraints can be effective in increasing women's participation. For instance, surveys across various contexts find a substantive gender gap in political knowledge. Can the provision of this political knowledge increase participation? Indeed, Giné and Mansuri (2018) find that an informational campaign targeted to women in rural Pakistan in advance of the 2008 elections significantly increases turnout. Anecdotal accounts reveal that women may have less time for political participation – in the case of turning out to vote if election-day is a holiday, men may be freed from their primary work responsibilities in order to participate, but it means little to nothing for women whose household work responsibilities remain unaltered by a an official holiday. In a more ad-hoc "intervention", the former election commissioner of India recounts polling officers speeding up women's lines after noticing that women were more likely to be deterred by the long lines at a polling station (Quraishi, 2014).

A second set of explanations points to the limited explanatory power of re-

source differences between men and women. Atkeson and Rapoport (2003) find that within the US, gender gaps in political attitude expression persist even after accounting for a set of resources; they point instead to the importance of gendered socialization as an explanation. Socialization into particular gender roles that deem politics as a primarily male domain may inhibit women's willingness to both accumulate and use the resources necessary for political participation. Moreover, given similar resources, women may evaluate their own capacity to participate differently from men: Karpowitz and Mendelberg (2014) find that even after controlling for civic and social abilities, women are less likely to believe that they are able to effectively speak up at public meetings (qtd. in Preece (2016)). This has important implications for the types of interventions that could boost women's participation; Preece (2016) suggests that "we must address the 'gendered psyche' that prevents many women from fully participating in civic life."

In certain contexts, social norms governing what constitutes "appropriate" behavior for men and women may constrain women's participation in politics in explicit ways. Efforts to boost participation without accounting for these norms may be ineffective, or even backfire. Gottlieb (2016) documents how a civic education campaign in rural Mali increased both men and women's levels of political knowledge but *widened* the gender gap in actual political participation – she finds evidence that women compensated for deviating from norms by participating in the civic education program by limiting future participation, and received overt threats or sanctions from men.

Finally, the gender gap in participation may also be driven by the gender gap in mobilization to participate. Fox and Lawless (2010) document substantial differences across similarly situated men and women in recruitment to run for public office i.e. women are less likely to be asked to run as candidates. In a survey of adult men and women in Faisalabad, Pakistan, Khan (2017*a*) finds that women are

significantly less likely to report being personally encouraged to vote by a party worker or candidate or by a friend/relative. In the case of rural India, Prillaman (2017) suggests that patterns of mobilization that exclude women may obtain in a system of “family-centered clientelism" whereby parties target households as units and seek only to mobilize the (usually male) head of household.

The intervention we test in this study seek to increase women’s participation by explicitly mobilizing women, and easing the constraints around motivation, “gendered psyche” and restrictive social norms described above. We do not differentiate between motivation and resource based explanations, but rather test whether targeting the mobilization at men, women or both makes a difference.

## Context

Pakistan is a federal parliamentary democracy, which has witnessed multiple cycles of authoritarian and democratic rule since independence in 1947. General elections for the national legislature are held on a first-past-the-post basis for 272 seats. Voting takes place at polling booths, located within polling stations in constituencies. Polling booths for men and women are always separate, and there exists a mix of gender segregated and mixed polling stations.

The last general election of 2013 was a landmark in Pakistan’s democratic history as it represented the first civilian transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another. It was the most widely contested election in Pakistan’s history and was deemed by local and international observers to be the freest and fairest in the country since 1970 (Cookman and Wilder, 2013). However the potential for true democratic consolidation in Pakistan is undermined by the fact that while universal franchise, a widely accepted prerequisite for democracy, exists on paper, it is absent in practice. In some exceptional cases this is a result of explicit informal agreements between village leaders and political parties . How-

ever even in the absence of outright bans, women lagged behind men in terms of voter registration[3] and turnout[4].

Various actors have been involved in the drive to improve women's electoral participation in the 2018 elections, and much of these efforts have been focused on closing the registration gap[5]. However, sizable gender gaps in participation exist even among registered voters, indicating that constraints beyond lack of legal identification continue to limit women's participation.

We conduct the study in Pakistan's second largest city: Lahore. A previous study conducted by Cheema, Liaqat and Mohmand (2017) in Lahore finds significant gender gaps in in self-reported turnout among registered voters, along with gaps in other forms of inter-electoral participation such as communicating with party workers and local representatives. Moreover, they also find that women are about 10% less likely to have been contacted by a party representative to vote in the last local election, which suggests that the mobilization gap is well and alive in this context.

[3]The gap in voter registration stems from a gap in legal identification – women over the age of 18 are less likely than men to have a National Identification Card (NIC), which is tied to automatic inclusion on electoral rolls

[4]although gender disaggregated turnout data from 2013 is not available, there is a visible gender gap in turnout in self-reported survey measures, and comparisons of overall turnout at male-only and female-only polling stations in selected areas

[5]In 2015, the Free and Fair Elections Network – a coalition of 30 domestic non-governmental organizations established in 2006 to observe general elections and mobilize voters in Pakistan – declared a "Women Voters Registration Emergency" calling attention to the issue of millions of women being missing from electoral rolls. The Election Commission of Pakistan has established a dedicated "Gender Affairs Wing" to increase and facilitate women's participation in the electoral process, importantly this includes a "Female Voter Registration Campaign" started in November 2017 in 79 districts to facilitate women to acquire NICs.

## 2.3 Study Design

### Sample

The sample for this study is comprised of 2500 households across 500 wards (lowest local administrative unit). The 500 wards are drawn from 94 Union Councils (local administrative unit) in the northern part of the city of Lahore. The union councils are spread across across seven national electoral constituencies (NA-124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130) and each union council is divided into 6 wards. The ward is our primary unit of randomization. To draw a sample of 500 wards, we include all 6 wards from a random subset of 30 Union Councils, and randomly select 5 out of 6 wards for inclusion in the study from the remaining 64 Union Councils. Figure 2.1 shows a map of our sample:

Figure 2.1: Sample Union Councils and Wards in Lahore




Within each ward, enumerators survey two individuals (a randomly selected

man and woman) in 5 households at baseline giving us a sample of 5000 individuals (50% male and 50% female) in 2500 households. A household is visited by a pair of enumerators (one male and one female), each of whom conduct the survey with a respondent of the same gender.

To select 5 households within a ward, we drop a location pin at a random point within each ward boundary. The pair of enumerators proceeds to the pin location for a ward, selects the nearest household to the right for the first survey, then selects four other households in the ward using the right hand rule, selecting the 7th household to the right of the last household included in the sample. A household is excluded from the sample if the dwelling is locked/empty, if all members of the household are not registered to vote, if all members are registered to vote outside of Lahore, or if there is not at least 1 adult woman and 1 adult man with a CNIC (Computerized National Identity Card, which is required to vote) available and consenting to be surveyed.[6] In any of these situations, the enumerator skips the dwelling and proceeds to one immediately to the right of it. Within the household, respondents are selected by listing all N eligible (over the age of 18 and possessing a CNIC) respondents of a particular gender in order of age. After the listing is complete, a random number generator programmed in the survey tablet generates a number n, and the enumerator asks to speak with the *nth* listed eligible individual to conduct a baseline survey, conditional on oral consent.

## Random Assignment

We use a two-stage randomization process in which geographical clusters are first assigned to a treatment status, and then a subset of households within a cluster are

[6]We restrict the sample to households with individuals who could plausibly cast a vote (have a CNIC and are registered in Lahore) because our mobilization intervention is conducted after the preparation of electoral rolls, which means we cannot reasonably expect it to effect changes in voter registration

randomly assigned to receive treatment.

- Stage 1: Blocked Random Assignment at Cluster Level

  The experimental design is a 2x2 factorial producing 4 possible treatment conditions (see Table 2.1). We assign 500 clusters (wards) to 1 of these 4 treatment conditions, blocking on Union Council (administrative unit in which wards are nested)

Table 2.1: Factorial Design

| | No Women Targeted | Women Targeted |
|---|---|---|
| No Men Targeted | Control | T1 (Women Only) |
| Men Targeted | T2 (Men Only) | T3 (Women+Men) |

- Stage 2: Random Assignment at Household Level

  Within each cluster, a random 4/5 of surveyed households within a cluster receive the treatment assigned at the cluster level.This makes for a partial population design in which all treated clusters have the same treatment saturation (0.8); the design allows us to estimate spillover effects on untreated households within treatment clusters.

- Additional: Within Treatment Randomization

  Within treatment households, we cross randomize two treatment variations:

  1. In a random half of all treated households, mobilizers provide additional information that the mobilization activity is being conducted at a larger scale and mobilizers are visiting many households across their constituency.

2. In a random half of all treated households that receive the male mobilization treatment (T2 and T3), mobilizers explicitly discourage men from outside the household from joining in the intervention. We do this because the mobilization with men is often conducted outside the premises of the home and may attract other men from the neighborhood. By randomly controlling whether non-household men can join in or not, we can assess whether non-household participation moderates treatment effects of T2 and T3.

Figure 2.2 shows the crossed experimental randomizations, with sample sizes at the ward, household and individual respondent level, reported in parentheses.

Figure 2.2: Randomization Scheme



Table 2.2 shows the means and standard errors for several important variables (measured at baseline) in the control and 3 main treatment groups produced by the randomization procedure described above. We report the p-values from t-tests of difference in means between the control and each of the three treatment groups, and F-statistics from tests of joint significance.

Table 2.2: Statistical Balance between Treatment and Control Groups

| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | | T-test P-value | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Control | T1 | T2 | T3 | | | |
| Variable | Mean/SE | Mean/SE | Mean/SE | Mean/SE | (1)-(2) | (1)-(3) | (1)-(4) |
| Age(Yrs) | 40.042 | 39.577 | 40.698 | 39.597 | 0.158 | 0.283 | 0.157 |
| | (0.461) | (0.455) | (0.423) | (0.457) | | | |
| Adult Men | 2.626 | 2.717 | 2.598 | 2.925 | 0.610 | 0.980 | 0.005*** |
| | (0.074) | (0.152) | (0.077) | (0.130) | | | |
| Adult Women | 2.269 | 2.296 | 2.173 | 2.373 | 0.770 | 0.078* | 0.214 |
| | (0.064) | (0.082) | (0.063) | (0.096) | | | |
| Married | 0.782 | 0.765 | 0.766 | 0.783 | 0.279 | 0.337 | 0.984 |
| | (0.013) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.014) | | | |
| Employed | 0.366 | 0.361 | 0.374 | 0.365 | 0.346 | 0.628 | 0.852 |
| | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.014) | | | |
| Has Cellphone | 0.800 | 0.810 | 0.793 | 0.810 | 0.519 | 0.138 | 0.601 |
| | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.015) | | | |
| Has CNIC | 0.986 | 0.987 | 0.987 | 0.990 | 0.833 | 0.641 | 0.220 |
| | (0.004) | (0.003) | (0.003) | (0.003) | | | |
| Voted(2013) | 0.661 | 0.662 | 0.632 | 0.630 | 0.984 | 0.053* | 0.154 |
| | (0.014) | (0.015) | (0.014) | (0.016) | | | |
| Likely to Vote | 0.826 | 0.814 | 0.823 | 0.832 | 0.665 | 0.888 | 0.628 |
| | (0.012) | (0.011) | (0.011) | (0.013) | | | |
| PML-N Supporter | 0.569 | 0.589 | 0.557 | 0.579 | 0.486 | 0.413 | 0.737 |
| | (0.016) | (0.015) | (0.017) | (0.016) | | | |
| N | 1250 | 1250 | 1250 | 1250 | | | |
| Clusters | 125 | 125 | 125 | 125 | | | |
| F-test of joint significance (F-stat) | | | | | 0.513 | 1.483 | 1.487 |
| F-test, number of observations | | | | | 2500 | 2500 | 2500 |

*Notes*: The value displayed for t-tests are p-values. The value displayed for F-tests are the F-statistics. Standard errors are clustered at variable ward. Fixed effects using variable uc_no are included in all estimation regressions. All missing values in balance variables are treated as zero.***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Note that there appears to be some imbalance on the mean number of adults in a household; we account for this in household level analysis since we use the proportion of adults whose turnout could be verified as the outcome measure.

## Intervention Design

The intervention is a 20-25 minute door-to-door mobilization visit to a household within the 4 weeks prior to the Pakistan General Elections held on 25 July 2018. A typical visit has the following components:

*Introduction*

A mobilizer from one of the civil society organizations (Aurat Foundation or South Asia Partnership) visits a treatment household unannounced and requests to speak with the individual who was surveyed at baseline. They give a short introduction about who they are, explicitly stating that their organization is non-partisan. The mobilizers also had with them letters of approval from the Election Commission of Pakistan, which they showed to households or individuals who were initially skeptical of their civil society organization affiliation to assure them of non-partisanship. If the baseline respondent was unavailable, the mobilizer inquired when they might be home and if able to secure a time for later in the same day, they moved on to other households in the same area and returned to the household later. If after 3 attempts, they were unable to make contact with the baseline respondent, they asked to speak with any adult individuals of the same gender as the baseline respondent who were living in the household, and available at the time. If and when able to make contact, the mobilizer asked the baseline respondent to gather all adult individuals of the same gender who were living in the household are available at the time.

*Motivational Video*

The mobilizer shows the individuals who gathered a short 5 minute video on a tablet screen. The video follows the narrative of a young woman facing issues of poor service delivery in her neighborhood, who decides to make her voice heard by contacting a political candidate, and casting her vote in the election. Her brother

is shown in an enabling role: he encourages her to take action and also agrees to help the women in his family get to the women's polling station on his motorbike.

*Informational Leaflets*

The mobilizer provides some procedural information about how to find out the location of one's polling booth, the process of voting and associated rules as well as the role of elected officials at the national and provincial level and the symbols assigned to various parties, using leaflets with pictorial aids. The household members are offered copies of the leaflets to keep. The leaflets are reproduced in Appendix B.1

*Mock Ballot Exercise*

The mobilizer uses mock ballot papers, ballot boxes and a stamp to show the household members exactly how to mark the ballot, fold the paper and put it in the ballot box, emphasizing that there are two ballots (a green one for the National Assembly and a white one for the Provincial Assembly) that will be available to voters on Election Day.

The treatment arms correspond to the different targets of the canvassing visit. In T1 (women only), the visit is carried out by a female mobilizer and targeted to the female baseline survey respondent in a treatment household, and other women present in the household at the time. In T2 (men only), the visit is carried out by a male mobilizer and targeted to the male baseline survey respondent in a treatment household, and the other men present in the household at the time. T3 (women and men) is a combination of T1 and T2: treatment households receive two visits, one by a female mobilizer targeting the female baseline respondent and women in the household and another by a male mobilizer targeting the male baseline respondent and other men in the household. The factorial design enables us to identify the effect of mobilizing women (a comparison of T1 and T3 to T2 and control); mobilizing men (a comparison of T2 and T3 to T1 and control); mobilizing women

alone (T1 to control); mobilizing men alone (T2 to control); mobilizing men and women together (

The two visits in T3 are carried out by different mobilizers, and often at separate times due to the different schedules at which men are available at home. They are often also carried out in different places because non-family men are typically not invited inside the home, especially in one room houses where it is difficult to maintain gender segregation indoors. Thus male mobilizer visits in T2 and T3 often take place outside the home.

Mobilization visits targeted to women in T1 and T3 are carried out by women while visits targeted to men in T2 and T3 are carried out by men. We use same-gender mobilizers largely due to gendered norms of segregation in a Pakistani social context. This also closely mirrors the patterns of contact that occurs between partisan party workers and voters. In our baseline survey, we ask individual respondents to recall whether their household was visited by a political party worker as part of a door-to-door mobilization during the last election campaign period. As noted earlier, women report lower rates of contact than men. However, for the respondents who do report contact, we also ask whether they were visited by male party workers, female party workers, or both. 57% of respondents reporting a visit say they were visited by both male and female party workers, 40% report being visited by only male workers, and a mere 3% report being visited by exclusively female party workers. Among those who report being visited by exclusively male workers, 76% report that there was no direct contact with women in the household; this is reversed in the case of respondents reporting a mixed gender visit, among that group 82% report that there was direct contact with women. This leads us to believe that accessing women in households requires same-gender mobilizers. Alternatively however, could women mobilizers have contacted men in T2 and T3? Given the low rates of reported partisan contact with exclusively women party

workers (only 33 respondents, of which 7 are men report this) we decided that having women mobilizers contacting men would make for a risky novelty factor. Moreover, when piloting the intervention, we observed instances of women mobilizers who approached men being told to go speak to women in the household. If this occurred systematically, it would have made implementing T2 as an exclusively male-targeted intervention difficult.

## Hypotheses

### Primary Hypotheses

In this study, we seek to explore whether a non-partisan mobilization visit with motivational and informational component can increase turnout among targeted individuals and households. Given that women do not often have autonomous decision making power over their decision to participate in politics, we are interested in whether the visit being targeted at women, men or both matters for effects on women's turnout in particular insofar as convincing men about the importance of women's vote removes a binding constraint on women's participation. Additionally, given existing findings of within-household mobilization, it is possible that mobilizing women (men) positively influences the turnout of other men (women) in the household through an indirect channel, thus we are also interested in effects on men's turnout.

- H1: Mobilization treatments (T1, T2 and T3) increase women's turnout
- H2: Mobilization treatments (T1, T2 and T3) increase men's turnout

We are also interested in the effects of the cross-randomized treatment variations of providing information about the mobilization to treated households and encouraging privacy (i.e. discouraging men from outside the household from being part of the intervention), however we are agnostic as to the direction. In the

case of the information treatment, we may think that introducing common knowledge about the mobilization treatment encourages individuals to change their attitudes on the acceptability of women's electoral participation and further boost treatment effects. On the other hand, providing this information in the context of an encouragement to vote intervention could encourage free-riding and reduce a voters' sense of pivotality and dampen the treatment effects. Similarly, the encouragement of privacy could make the male mobilization more effective if male members of a household are more receptive to a message about women's participation without other men from the neighborhood present.

- H3: Information about mobilization increases/decreases turnout
- H4: Encouraging privacy increases/decreases turnout

**Secondary Hypotheses**

Beyond, the main hypotheses on turnout, we are also interested in the testing how the mobilization campaigns influence the following outcomes. These outcomes are what we consider to be the potential channels (based on theoretical predictions and exploratory findings from focus groups) through which the intervention could have increased women's turnout:

- men's support for women's political participation (logistical help on election day, and continued expression of support)
- political knowledge
- interest in politics
- sense of political efficacy (women's own, and as perceived by men)
- household discussions about politics
- perceived norms of women's political participation

## Data

We draw on two main sources of data for analyses presented in this paper. The first is a panel survey conducted with 5000 respondents in 2500 households three months prior to the 2018 General Election at baseline; these households are then revisited 2 months after the election for the collection of endline data. The turnout data come from a thumb ink verification exercise conducted in the 2 days following the general elections (July 26 and 27) during which enumerators attempted made visits to all 2500 study households and visually verified turnout among household members by looking at the indelible ink marks made on a voter's thumb by a polling officer on Election Day. These ink marks begin to fade after 2-3 days which is why the activity was carried out by a large team of 50 enumerators in the 2 days immediately after the election. In the absence of administrative data of voter records of turnout , we use this method as an alternative to survey-reported turnout which is prone to over-reporting. Although there are methods to decrease over-reporting in a survey context, we may think that the intervention itself could affect individuals' desire to report that they voted, making such measures especially unreliable. Due to this we use the thumb ink verification as our main outcome measure. In the visit to the household following the election, enumerators attempt to relocate the baseline respondent (who is also the individual to whom the intervention is primarily targeted, although we consider the intervention to be household level) in study households, and thus verify turnout for all available household members.

We are able to verify female turnout in 86% and male turnout in 88% of our baseline sample. In some of these cases, the individual baseline respondent was not present at the time of our visit. At the individual level, we were able to 79% of female baseline respondents and 49% of male baseline respondents successfully. The rate of relocation for male baseline respondents is lower due to limited availability of working men in a tight timeline. Since the activity had to be completed there

were no revisit to locate unavailable respondents. We address the issue of sample attrition in the following section. Finally, we also collect endline data from 97% of our 2500 study households to test hypotheses related to effects of the intervention on attitudes, perceived norms and lasting changes in willingness to participate in politics.

## 2.4 Results

### Manipulation Checks

To assess compliance with the treatment, we estimate OLS models to verify whether individual men and women baseline respondents in the different treatment categories recalled a visit from a non partisan canvasser. All models include UC (block) fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the ward level, which is the level of randomization for T1, T2 and T3. Results are reported in Table 2.3.

Roughly two months after General Election 2018, respondents in treatment households were significantly more likely to recall that their household received a canvassing visit from a non-partisan organization in the days leading up to the election. Men and women in the T1 and T3 conditions were almost twice as likely to state that their household received such a visit, benchmarked against a control group mean of 14 and 13 percent for women and men respectively. Importantly, while men in the T2 condition were 10 percentage points more likely to state their household received such a visit, women in households that received T2 were no more likely than women in control households to recall a visit. This result implies that men are likely to know about female mobilizers visiting women in the household, women are not likely to find out when a male mobilizer visits men in the household. This is consistent with field reports according to which male mobilizers would often speak with available men in the household at or just outside the entry-way to

the household structure and it is plausible that women would not find out about the structure of the household, while female mobilizers usually conducted the session inside the home and while they spoke to women privately, men present in the home at the time would ostensibly be aware of the visit.

Overall, these reported rates of visit are significantly lower than the compliance rates revealed by random back-checks conducted by surveyors (separate from the mobilization team) during the roll-out of the intervention. This discrepancy may be due to a number of factors, including the possibility that a different household member received the mobilization visit or that respondents failed to recall the visit two months after it occurred.

As an additional test, we also ask respondents to recall whether they received canvassing visits from partisan mobilizers belonging to the main political parties in the area prior to the election. There is no evidence of treatment households in either condition reporting more visits by partisan mobilizers (see Columns (2) - (4) of Table 2.3).

Table 2.3: Results: Manipulation Checks

| | Panel A: Women's Responses | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| | **Non-Partisan Visit** | **PML-N Visit** | **PTI Visit** | **Other Party Visit** |
| T1 | 0.098*** | 0.028 | 0.001 | -0.005 |
| | (0.032) | (0.022) | (0.018) | (0.037) |
| T2 | 0.021 | 0.031 | 0.009 | -0.024 |
| | (0.028) | (0.022) | (0.018) | (0.036) |
| T3 | 0.112*** | 0.010 | -0.009 | 0.029 |
| | (0.029) | (0.022) | (0.018) | (0.036) |
| Within T Control | 0.015 | 0.034 | 0.009 | 0.011 |
| | (0.026) | (0.023) | (0.019) | (0.034) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.192 | 0.135 | 0.185 | 0.202 |
| # Observations | 2435 | 2435 | 2435 | 2435 |
| | **Panel B: Men's Responses** | | | |
| T1 | 0.113*** | 0.011 | -0.026 | -0.026 |
| | (0.029) | (0.037) | (0.033) | (0.031) |
| T2 | 0.092*** | -0.015 | -0.038 | -0.047 |
| | (0.027) | (0.035) | (0.032) | (0.030) |
| T3 | 0.141*** | 0.021 | -0.006 | -0.034 |
| | (0.028) | (0.035) | (0.031) | (0.031) |
| Within T Control | 0.053** | 0.033 | -0.028 | -0.024 |
| | (0.024) | (0.035) | (0.031) | (0.029) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.246 | 0.262 | 0.234 | 0.194 |
| # Observations | 2434 | 2434 | 2434 | 2434 |

*Notes*: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All columns show results using OLS estimation. All four outcomes are binary variables. Column (1) is an indicator for respondent answered yes to the question: "Did representatives from from Aurat Foundation, SAP-PK or ECP visit your household in the days leading up to the election?" Columns (2)-(4) are indicators for whether the respondent stated that a PML-N representative, PTI representative or any other party's representative respectively visited their household in the days leading up to the election. Controls for the two cross-randomized treatments (privacy and information) are included. * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

## Turnout

We estimate OLS models to identify effects of treatment on turnout among individual men and women baseline respondents, and on turnout among men and women at the household level. The main coefficients of interest are on the treatment indicator variables for T1, T2 and T3. Turnout is verified directly by inspecting the thumbs of individuals in our sample, as described in Section 2.3. We include indicators for the treatment variations of privacy encouragement and provision of

information about the mobilization, and for whether a household was assigned to be a within-treatment control household in a ward. All models include UC (block) fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the ward level, which is the level of randomization for T1, T2 and T3. Table 2.4 shows the results.

The mobilization campaign does not appear to affect men's turnout at the individual or household level. Mobilizing women (pooling conditions T1 and T3) does not appear to have significant effect on women's turnout, except in the case where men are also mobilized (T3), when it increases the probability of an individual woman respondent turning out by 6 percentage points (significant at the 10% level); and increases the proportion of women turning out in a household by 8 percentage points (significant at the 5% level). Overall, mobilizing men (pooling conditions T2 and T3) has a positive effect on women's turnout at the household level, increasing the proportion of women turning out by 6 percentage points (significant at the 5% level); mobilizing men alone (T2) also appears to be effective, increasing the proportion of women turning out by 5.5 percentage points (significant at the 10% level). We also see that the information treatment variation has a consistently negative effect on women's turnout across models. The encouragement for privacy treatment variation does not appear to make a difference. We do not see any effects on individuals in control households within treatment wards, suggestive that there are no discernible geographical spillover effects to nearby households.

Taken together, the results suggest that targeting women with a canvassing campaign is insufficient to improve women's turnout in the context of this study. On the other hand, there is strong evidence that mobilizing men is necessary – and some suggestive evidence that it is sufficient – to improve the turnout of women living in their households. Although we see the strongest positive effects on women's turnout in the condition where both men and women are targeted with the mobilization campaign, the results do not allow us to conclusively say that mobilizing

both men and women together is necessary since we cannot reject the equivalence of T2 (mobilizing men) and T3 (mobilizing both men and women) from our data.

Table 2.4: Turnout among Individual Respondents and Households

| | **Panel A: Women's Turnout** | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) | (6) |
| | **Individual** | **Household** | **Individual** | **Household** | **Individual** | **Household** |
| T1,T3: Women Mobilized | 0.022 | 0.017 | | | | |
| | (0.022) | (0.020) | | | | |
| T2,T3: Men Mobilized | | | 0.039 | 0.062** | | |
| | | | (0.028) | (0.025) | | |
| T1:Women Only | | | | | 0.005 | 0.011 |
| | | | | | (0.033) | (0.029) |
| T2:Men Only | | | | | 0.022 | 0.055* |
| | | | | | (0.036) | (0.032) |
| T3: Women and Men | | | | | 0.062* | 0.080** |
| | | | | | (0.037) | (0.032) |
| Within T Control | 0.016 | 0.007 | 0.018 | 0.016 | 0.020 | 0.021 |
| | (0.031) | (0.026) | (0.031) | (0.026) | (0.034) | (0.028) |
| Information | -0.042* | -0.038* | -0.043* | -0.044** | -0.045* | -0.048** |
| | (0.025) | (0.021) | (0.025) | (0.020) | (0.027) | (0.022) |
| Privacy | 0.046* | 0.028 | 0.022 | -0.012 | 0.021 | -0.012 |
| | (0.025) | (0.023) | (0.031) | (0.028) | (0.032) | (0.028) |
| Constant | 0.892*** | 0.729*** | 0.896*** | 0.729*** | 0.898*** | 0.726*** |
| | (0.054) | (0.097) | (0.057) | (0.091) | (0.057) | (0.093) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.114 | 0.149 | 0.114 | 0.151 | 0.115 | 0.152 |
| # Observations | 1984 | 2149 | 1984 | 2149 | 1984 | 2149 |
| | **Panel B: Men's Turnout** | | | | | |
| T1,T3: Women Mobilized | 0.022 | 0.023 | | | | |
| | (0.028) | (0.018) | | | | |
| T2,T3: Men Mobilized | | | -0.008 | 0.012 | | |
| | | | (0.033) | (0.021) | | |
| T1:Women Only | | | | | 0.026 | 0.016 |
| | | | | | (0.040) | (0.027) |
| T2:Men Only | | | | | -0.004 | 0.006 |
| | | | | | (0.043) | (0.027) |
| T3: Women and Men | | | | | 0.014 | 0.036 |
| | | | | | (0.045) | (0.028) |
| Within T Control | 0.019 | 0.023 | 0.007 | 0.017 | 0.018 | 0.024 |
| | (0.037) | (0.023) | (0.036) | (0.022) | (0.039) | (0.025) |
| Information | 0.002 | -0.010 | 0.009 | -0.006 | 0.003 | -0.011 |
| | (0.030) | (0.018) | (0.029) | (0.017) | (0.031) | (0.018) |
| Privacy | -0.022 | 0.032 | -0.017 | 0.023 | -0.017 | 0.023 |
| | (0.035) | (0.021) | (0.041) | (0.024) | (0.041) | (0.024) |
| Constant | 0.985*** | 0.375*** | 0.999*** | 0.382*** | 0.984*** | 0.377*** |
| | (0.017) | (0.052) | (0.011) | (0.056) | (0.027) | (0.054) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.158 | 0.200 | 0.157 | 0.200 | 0.158 | 0.201 |
| # Observations | 1223 | 2190 | 1223 | 2190 | 1223 | 2190 |

*Notes*: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All columns show results using OLS estimation.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

**Attrition**

We follow Lee (2009) and use trimming bounds to account for non-random missingness in our outcome data across treatment groups. The key assumption for the use of trimming bounds are the monotonicity condition, whereby treatment assignment effects attrition in one direction. In our sample, observed attrition is consistently higher in the control group than in treatment groups. We report attrition corrected results for the turnout outcomes for women at the individual and household level (where we see significant effects in the main specifications) in Table 2.5

Table 2.5: Attrition Bounds on Women's Turnout

| | (1) F(Ind)Upper | (2) F(Ind)Lower | (3) F(Prop)Upper | (4) F(Prop)Lower |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | 0.021 | -0.002 | 0.021 | 0.005 |
| | (0.033) | (0.034) | (0.029) | (0.029) |
| T2 | 0.055 | 0.008 | 0.058* | 0.051 |
| | (0.035) | (0.037) | (0.032) | (0.031) |
| T3 | 0.085** | 0.051 | 0.084*** | 0.076** |
| | (0.037) | (0.038) | (0.032) | (0.032) |
| Within T Cntrl | 0.028 | 0.017 | 0.024 | 0.020 |
| | (0.033) | (0.034) | (0.028) | (0.028) |
| Information | -0.050* | -0.041 | -0.048** | -0.056*** |
| | (0.027) | (0.027) | (0.022) | (0.022) |
| Privacy | 0.006 | 0.024 | -0.005 | -0.008 |
| | (0.031) | (0.032) | (0.029) | (0.028) |
| Constant | 0.887*** | 0.902*** | 0.720*** | 0.732*** |
| | (0.059) | (0.056) | (0.093) | (0.093) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Observations | 1953 | 1953 | 2127 | 2127 |
| Adjusted $R^2$ | 0.069 | 0.070 | 0.104 | 0.115 |

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

We find that the the lower bound on the effect of T3 on individual women respondents' turnout and the lower bound of the effect of T2 on the proportion of women turning out in a household are not significantly different from zero. However, the lower and upper bounds of the effect of T3 on proportion of women turning out in a household remains significantly different from zero and the size of the

estimated effect is not substantively reduced.

## Men's Behavior beyond Election Day

Do the mobilizations campaigns have any effect on men's behavior beyond election day? We designed and implemented a behavioral measure to ascertain whether the mobilization campaigns results in an increased likelihood of men championing women's role in democracy. At the end of our endline survey, we asked the men in our sample for permission to place a sticker on the entry-way to their residence. We randomized whether the sticker we offered them was a generic sticker indicating their support for democracy or a gendered sticker indicating their support for democracy as well as women's role in democracy. The design of this measure is described in detail in Appendix B.2.

Table 2.6 shows results from OLS models estimating the effect of the sticker type offered, and the treatment condition, on take-up of the sticker by men at endline.

There are no significant differences in take-up across treatment groups for the generic pro-democracy sticker. We do find that the take-up of the sticker with a pro-women slogan is lower in the control group by almost 5 percentage points, with the p-value on the difference between the take-up of the generic and gendered sticker being lower than 0.05. This differential in take-up rates was not significantly reduced for men whose households received the women-only (T1) campaign or men-only (T2) campaign, but is fully alleviated in the conditions where men are mobilized (T2 and T3). In households that were visited both male and female mobilizers (T3), men were 7.6 percentage points more likely to take up the gendered sticker compared to those in the control group.

Table 2.6: Results: Men's Costly Supportive Behavior

| | Men's Costly Support for Women's Role in Democracy | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| Gendered Sticker (GS) | -0.033** | -0.047*** | -0.047** |
| | (0.014) | (0.014) | (0.022) |
| T2,T3:Women Mobilized | 0.004 | | |
| | (0.013) | | |
| Women Mobilized * GS | 0.019 | | |
| | (0.019) | | |
| T1,T3:Men Mobilized | | -0.004 | |
| | | (0.013) | |
| Men Mobilized * GS | | 0.053*** | |
| | | (0.020) | |
| T1:Women Only | | | 0.010 |
| | | | (0.020) |
| T2:Men Only | | | 0.001 |
| | | | (0.020) |
| T3:Women and Men | | | -0.013 |
| | | | (0.020) |
| T1*GS | | | -0.012 |
| | | | (0.031) |
| T2*GS | | | 0.029 |
| | | | (0.031) |
| T3*GS | | | 0.076*** |
| | | | (0.028) |
| Constant | 0.944*** | 0.947*** | 0.949*** |
| | (0.009) | (0.009) | (0.014) |
| # Observations | 2434 | 2434 | 2434 |

*Notes*: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

## Potential Channels

We use questions asked during an endline survey to investigate the channel through which the mobilization campaigns may have impacted women's turnout. We thematically group these questions into six indices containing relevant attitudes or self-reported behavior. These indices are: (i) political knowledge, (ii) interest in politics, (iii) women's self-efficacy, (iv) logistical help from men, (v) whether there was cross-gender political discussion within the household and (vi) the perception

of descriptive norms about women's political participation. Figure 2.3 and Table 2.7 show the results.

Figure 2.3: Results on Channels



Table 2.7: Results: Channels

| | (1) Political Knowledge | (2) Interest in Politics | (3) Women's Self Efficacy | (4) Logistic Help from Men | (5) Political Discussion | (6) Norm Perception |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Panel A: Effects on Women's Responses** | | | | | | |
| T1 | -0.039 | 0.028 | -0.020 | -0.070 | -0.005 | -0.078 |
| | (0.073) | (0.055) | (0.078) | (0.073) | (0.033) | (0.064) |
| T2 | -0.078 | 0.089 | -0.002 | -0.032 | 0.035 | 0.013 |
| | (0.082) | (0.055) | (0.083) | (0.079) | (0.035) | (0.073) |
| T3 | -0.101 | 0.039 | -0.013 | 0.158** | 0.058* | -0.054 |
| | (0.079) | (0.058) | (0.078) | (0.078) | (0.034) | (0.071) |
| Within T Ctrl | -0.047 | 0.008 | 0.052 | 0.090 | 0.029 | 0.004 |
| | (0.070) | (0.048) | (0.073) | (0.065) | (0.032) | (0.065) |
| Constant | -1.168*** | -0.394*** | -0.423 | 0.204 | 0.618*** | -0.183* |
| | (0.256) | (0.149) | (0.294) | (0.176) | (0.080) | (0.106) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.184 | 0.244 | 0.134 | 0.236 | 0.141 | 0.194 |
| # Observations | 2433 | 2435 | 2431 | 2381 | 2499 | 2435 |
| **Panel B: Effects on Men's Responses** | | | | | | |
| T1 | -0.013 | 0.015 | -0.005 | 0.055 | 0.032 | 0.049 |
| | (0.038) | (0.070) | (0.072) | (0.071) | (0.036) | (0.084) |
| T2 | -0.009 | -0.010 | -0.014 | 0.002 | 0.006 | -0.021 |
| | (0.042) | (0.069) | (0.075) | (0.077) | (0.036) | (0.092) |
| T3 | -0.052 | 0.133* | 0.074 | 0.173** | 0.065* | -0.036 |
| | (0.046) | (0.074) | (0.078) | (0.076) | (0.038) | (0.084) |
| Within T Ctrl | -0.019 | 0.047 | -0.030 | 0.078 | 0.022 | 0.011 |
| | (0.040) | (0.064) | (0.064) | (0.069) | (0.033) | (0.077) |
| Constant | 0.704*** | 0.563*** | -0.293* | 0.725*** | 0.261** | 0.182 |
| | (0.095) | (0.124) | (0.158) | (0.118) | (0.108) | (0.395) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.155 | 0.260 | 0.137 | 0.185 | 0.159 | 0.250 |
| # Observations | 2433 | 2434 | 2433 | 2431 | 2255 | 2433 |

*Notes*: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All columns show results using OLS estimation. All outcomes are standardized indices, except for column (5). Column (5) is an indicator variable for whether men (women) stated they discussed politics with a woman (man) in the household . For the remaining five columns, definitions of the variables composing the indices and results on each individual component are included in additional appendix tables.* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

We find no evidence that any of the three mobilization campaigns have an effect on the women's political knowledge or interest in politics. Similarly, women's self efficacy in the political sphere is unaffected by our mobilization campaigns. We also find no effects on perceptions that women's political participation has become more common than before.

The two channels that our mobilization campaign did affect were whether men and women within a household discussed politics with each other and whether men provided logistical support to women on the day of the election. Logistical

help from men was 0.17-0.19 standard deviations higher in the group of households that received both the male and female canvassing visits, as shown in Column (5) of Table 2.7. Women and men in these households, respectively, were 7.1 and 5.5 percentage points more likely to discuss politics with a household member of the opposite gender.

Taken together, these results imply that while our the canvassing visits did not increase women's knowledge of and interest in politics, nor did they lead to an increased self-efficacy for women when it comes to political matters, they do result in the removal of important constraints that are related to men - only when both men and women receive the canvassing visit. Specifically, in households that received T3, men and women hold more political conversations with each other within the household, and men are more likely to have provided logistical support on election day such as arranging transport and sharing household responsibilities and waiting for women outside female polling stations.[7]

## 2.5 Discussion

In this study we examine the effects of a non-partisan mobilization campaign conducted prior to the Pakistan General Elections on women's turnout. The campaign has both motivational and informational components, which seek to redress observed gender gaps in motivation and political information observed at baseline. We find that the campaign has no effects on women's turnout when it is targeted

[7]We test whether this result could be spurious due to the multiple comparisons we are running, using pooled results shown in Table B.1. Even using the extreme Bonferroni correction which corrects for multiple comparisons by simply dividing the target p-value by the number of comparisons being made, the p-value of the effect on logistical help from men (0.001) is lower than the target p-value suggested by the Bonferroni correction (0.003). This calculation uses the fact that we are computing 18 different p-values - six each for the three treatment groups, this dividing the 'target' p-value of 0.05 by 18, which equals 0.0028. The p-value on the effect on political discussion (0.005) is not below the extreme Bonferroni correction, but is below the target value (0.006) suggested by the less stringent Benjamini-Hochberg correction.

only at women, but strong effects when targeted at both men and women in households. We interpret this as suggestive evidence that low levels of women's political participation in this context are at least in part a result of real or perceived constraints from men in their households, and that increasing these levels requires engaging those men. On the other hand, engaging men seems to be necessary but not sufficient: any observed effects of exclusively targeting men as part of the campaign are far weaker. It is only when we engage both that we see movement on women's participation.

Moreover, the mobilization campaigns – regardless of target – do not seem to produce improvement in standard predictors of political participation among women i.e. political knowledge, interest, self-efficacy or perceived descriptive norms of women's participation more broadly. However, we do observe that when the campaign is targeted at both men and women, treatment households report greater levels of political discussion between men and women as well as higher levels of support for women's participation by men, as measured by survey reports of logistical help provided by men on election day, and a costly behavioral measure of a public expression of support for women's role in democracy two months after the election.

The findings are consistent with at least two potentially complementary accounts of men's role in women's participation. The first is of men as a binding constraint on women's participation who must be convinced to not restrain the women who may already want to participate from doing so. The second is of men as necessary enablers who can be harnessed to amplify mobilization messages and motivate women in their households who may not have previously wanted to participate to do so.

Chapter 3

# Limits to Equality:

# *Sensitivity of Attitudes to Gender Role Concerns*

# Abstract

In this paper, I explore patterns of variation in individual attitudes towards gender equality using survey data collected in Pakistan. I focus on two issue domains: 1) women's electoral participation and 2) girls' education. I use original survey measures of attitudinal support for gender equality which differentiate between abstract and concrete support for equality, and demonstrate that apparent consensus for equality in the abstract breaks down when it presents a concrete challenge to accepted gender roles. This insight can help explain persistently unequal outcomes in the face of what appears to be popular support for equality. In the case of girls' education – ostensibly an issue less likely to challenge gender roles – I show that pre-existing perceptions about levels of gender (in)equality in schooling are predictive of support for policies that would redress inequality. However, using a survey experiment, I demonstrate that new information correcting misperceptions about levels of inequality does not change attitudes. The paper contributes to the literature on public opinion on gender issues, makes a methodological contribution to the measurement of such attitudes in a survey context, and advances our understanding of when changes in support for equalizing reform may be possible.

## 3.1 Introduction

In his piece "The Many Faces of Gender Inequality", Sen (2001) writes "Gender inequality is not one homogeneous phenomenon, but a collection of disparate and interlinked problems." A cursory glance at the empirical trends in cross-national and individual-level data support this. In the realm of policy measures that can be considered to promote greater equality between men and women, Htun and Weldon (2018) draw on an original dataset of laws and policies on women's rights in seventy countries to demonstrate that "Women's rights vary not only across countries but also within them, depending on the issue." In the realm of individual attitudes towards equality, Kenny and Patel (2017) draw on survey data from six waves of the World Values Survey and find that "A single individual can report strongly different norms about women's equality in different domains." Anecdotally, we know that progress towards equality on issues or across domains that we may think of as "linked" often moves at different paces, and even in different directions. For instance, despite steady economic growth, lower fertility rates and a closing of the gender gap in school enrollment (all deemed predictive of women's labor force participation), women's labor force participation in India has stagnated and even declined in recent years (Fletcher, Pande and Moore, 2017). Finally, we can identify instances of policies and interventions that aim to advance equality, but either fail to change the status quo, or worse, produce a backlash effect e.g. Bhalotra, Brulé and Roy (2018) find that legislation guaranteeing equal inheritance rights for women in India is followed by a worsening of sex ratios; Gottlieb (2016) finds that while participation in a civics course in Mali increases both men and women's political knowledge, it ultimately leads women to withdraw from future civic participation.

Distinguishing between the different "faces" of gender equality, and identifying how they might be linked has both conceptual and practical importance for

understanding how progress towards equality occurs, and when we might expect to observe stalled progress, or backlash. However, as Htun and Weldon (2018) and Burns and Gallagher (2010) note, existing empirical research on gender equality in the realm of policy and public opinion tends to either consider a single issue at a time, or implicitly presume a unified set of issues. Some works which do consider multiple issues tend to classify these issues by topic area e.g. in *Theorizing Feminist Policy* Mazur (2002) considers policy formation in post-industrial policies and groups together policies under the following topics: political representation, equal employment, reconciliation, family law, and body politics. This is also true of various "indices" of gender equality e.g. the most widely used Global Gender Gap Index tracks country performance on subindices grouped by topic areas: Economic Participation and Opportunity, Educational Attainment, Health and Survival, and Political Empowerment. There are of course exceptions and explicit attempts by scholars to develop common frameworks to classify gender issues in ways other than topic area, and I explore these in the following section.

In this paper, I present two case studies of individual attitudes towards gender equality in two issue domains in Pakistan: 1) women's electoral participation, and 2) girls education. I demonstrate how the framework of equity and roles– originally developed to understand policy change on gender issues in the United States – can be useful in understanding variation and potential for change in individual attitudes for these two issues in particular, and other issues more broadly. I also draw on original survey measures that differentiate between abstract and concrete support for equality and show that abstract support for equality may break down in the face of concrete scenarios, which may help explain persisting unequal outcomes in the face of what seems like consensus around equality. Importantly, I argue that the "breaking point" for such consensus is when situations challenge existing gender roles. In the case of education – an issue I classify as being about

equity rather than roles – I use a survey experiment to show that pre-existing perceptions of levels of (in)equality are predictive of support for policies to redress inequality. However, the provision of accurate information that corrects misperceptions does not increase support in the expected direction and men and women respond differently to this information. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 reviews existing approaches to the classification of gender issue domains and resulting predictions on equal attitudes and policy support, Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 present the respective cases, Section 3.5 concludes.

## 3.2 Conceptual Frameworks for Gender Issues

### What is a Gender Issue?

The first question at hand is what constitutes a "gender issue", or interest. This is closely tied to the question of what constitutes women's issues or interests. Weldon (2011) notes that feminist scholars today generally reject the notion of a set of interests shared by women as a group, in summary because presuming a shared group identity among women runs the risk of essentialism (Celis et al., 2014) and ignorance of other forms of identities that may be crucial in shaping interests (Baldez, 2011). Nevertheless, Sanbonmatsu (2002) defines gender issues as ones that "affect women as a group and/or affect the traditional division of labor between men and women." In her study of public debate and policy on women's rights, Wolbrecht (2000) defines women's rights as issues for which "women are the intended beneficiary, constituency, or object." This is a narrower definition than Sanbonmatsu's, since it specifies the condition of *intent* to affect women in some way. Molyneux (1985) takes the "common denominator" approach stating that: "women may have certain general interests in common. These can be called gender interests to differentiate them from the false homogeneity imposed by the notion of women's inter-

ests."

For this paper, I define gender issues as ones that concern some aspect of gender inequality. This has considerable overlap with the definitions discussed earlier, but is intended to be more expansive. To illustrate: in Khan (2017*b*), I document a gap in men and women's priorities over public goods and services in a survey conducted in Faisalabad, Pakistan and ask what makes this this gap (and the gaps observed in different contexts of sub-Saharan Africa and India) a "gender-based" gap. I argue that the fact that these differences in priorities appear to be driven by attributes of social structures (specifically norms of unequal division of labor), rather than individual attributes of individual men and and women is what makes them "gender-based differences." Under this definition, distributive policies affecting the provision of goods and services that provide disproportionate/unequal benefits to men or women would also constitute "gender issues." These may be distributive policies where women are not the explicitly intended beneficiary, constituency or object (as per Wolbrecht), but they nevertheless affect women as a group. These are also policies that may not alter the division of labor between men and women (as per Sanbonmatsu), but their disproportionate impact on women is indeed due to underlying conditions of inequality in this division of labor.

## Typologies of Gender Issues

Existing typologies of gender issues, which are not based purely on issue domain, have some explicit or implicit sense of the processes through which these issues are articulated and politicized. For instance, Gelb and Palley (1982) use the framework of roles and equity to understand public policy progress on women's rights in the United States:

> Role equity issues are those policies which extend rights now en-

> joyed by other groups (men, other minorities) to women and which appear to be relatively delineated or narrow in their implications, permitting policymakers to seek advantage with feminist groups and voters with little cost or controversy. In contrast, role change issues appear to produce change in the dependent female role of wife, mother, and homemaker, holding out the potential of greater sexual freedom and independence in a variety of contexts. The latter issues are fraught with greater political pitfalls, including perceived threats to existing values, in turn creating visible and often powerful opposition.

However, the distinction between issues of role and equity has less to do with the intrinsic content of the issue, but rather how it is framed and understood at a particular time. Burns and Gallagher (2010) note, "Where an issue stands - whether it is about roles or equity or both - depends on the tools ordinary Americans use to think about the particular issue. We do not think it is possible to 'read' equity or roles from an actual policy." Burns and Gallagher (2010) extend this framework to understand public opinion, rather than policy progress, on gender issues. Their definition of a gender issue is also tied to public opinion, such they define an issue as being 'about gender' if "people use gendered tools, or cultural ideas about gender, to think about it." Again, this is narrower than the definition I propose under which an issue that has disproportionate effects for men and women – regardless of whether these individuals think of it through a gendered lens – would qualify as a gender issue.

Although they do not explicitly state this, Burns and Gallagher's conception of a gender issue implies some degree of consciousness of gender on the part of individuals who are thinking about it. Molyneux (1985) actively engages this question of consciousness in her treatment of gender interests, in which she differentiates between "strategic" and "practical" gender interests. In her typology, strategic interests are defined deductively: "that is, from the analysis of women's subordination and from the formulation of an alternative, more satisfactory set of arrangements to those which exists" while practical interests are defined inductively: "[they] arise

from the concrete conditions of women's positioning within the gender division of labor." The former involves consciousness of a larger end goal of equality and comprises the interests often classified as feminist, while the latter is a response to immediate needs, without necessarily the consciousness of this end goal. The conceptual distinction between interest types is then in the *process* by which the interests are formed or articulated, rather than one of issue content.

## Predicting Individual Attitudes and Policy Change

Burns and Gallagher make two empirical predictions based on the roles and equity framework: first, that public support for policies of equity is likely to be higher than that for roles, and second that the gender gap in public support for issues of roles is likely to be smaller than that for issues of equity. The first prediction mirrors Gelb and Palley's idea of when policy success is more likely; the rationale for the second lies in the understanding gender roles persist at least in part because they are accommodated, internalized and reinforced by women themselves.

A first caveat to the roles vs. equity typology of issues is of course that as gender roles evolve, issues that may previously have been about roles can become issues of equity. Second, if we think that relevant actors are aware of the difficulty (ease) of moving public opinion on issues of roles (equity), there are clear incentives to frame policy in terms of being about roles or equity, depending on the desired outcome. This second point somewhat undermines the predictive power of this typology for policy success – at the extreme it means that policy success will by definition involve issues of equity because successful changes are framed thus. Mansbridge (1986)'s analysis of the failed ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment in the United States illustrates this dynamic. However, in this case the proponents of the policy – arguably to their detriment – overstated the potential impacts of the policy on transforming gender roles, contributing, in Mansbridge's view, to the failed

ratification:

> ...if the ERA had been ratified, the Supreme Court would have been unlikely to use it to bring about major changes in the relations between American men and women, at least in the foreseeable future. Nor did the American public want any significant change in gender roles, whether at work, at home, or in society at large. The groups that fought for the ERA and the groups that fought against it, however, had a stake in believing that the ERA *would* produce those kinds of changes. With both the proponents and opponents of the ERA exaggerating the likely effects of ERA, legislators in wavering states became convinced that the ERA might, in fact, produce important substantive changes - and the necessary votes were lost. [...] The irony in all this is that the ERA would have had much less substantive effect than either proponents or opponents claimed."

The case of the ERA illustrates the shortcomings of thinking of the equity/role typology as binary, even in a snapshot of time. In this case a policy tool that was unlikely to produce role change, was strategically framed by opponents as having the potential to do so. Proponents could perhaps have had greater traction by framing it as lacking such potential, but they chose an expressive frame of potential for transformative change. Importantly, Mansbridge's analysis of failure of ratification is not just about the ERA being framed as a role issue, but it being framed as such in the absence of the requisite public demand for role change at the time. This approach implies a useful scope condition on Galb and Palley's prediction that role change policies are less to succeed: they are indeed less likely to succeed, *when there is no public demand for transformation of roles*. Alternatively we might think that the existence and persistence of certain roles is enough to imply that there is no demand for role-change, thus bringing us back to the idea that role change issues are by definition more contentious.

Mansbridge approaches the question of demand for role change empirically, rather than inferring a lack of appetite for change from the persistence of roles in society. She argues that apparent public support for the ERA in surveys reflected

support of general principles of equality in the abstract, rather than support for concrete changes in gender roles . She shows that among individuals who expressed support for the ERA in surveys conducted during the campaign for ratification, substantial numbers also held traditional views about women's roles.

> Americans have always favored 'rights' in the abstract. The principle that government should not deny anyone 'equal rights' commands widespread approval. But citizens who approve this principle are often quite conservative in practice. They support the principle of equal rights only insofar as they think it is compatible with the status quo.

I draw on Mansbridge's analysis to make a simple and generally applicable prediction about public opinion on gender issues: individuals' equitable attitudes on a gender issue are sensitive to threats to status quo gender roles. Put another way, individuals' support for what may prima facie seem like an "equity" issue may break down once a challenge to gender roles is introduced. While this threat may be likely in some issue domains more than others, no issue domain is intrinsically about equity or roles, and can be constructed either way. In the following two sections, I explore how this unfolds in two issue domains in Pakistan: women's electoral participation, and girls' schooling.

## 3.3 Women's Electoral Participation in Pakistan

### Equity or Roles?

Electoral politics in Pakistan remains a heavily male dominated affair. Men outnumber women by far in the pool of candidates, representatives, party leadership positions, party workers, voters, and even on electoral rolls. Women are less likely to be contacted by party workers and less likely to attend community "corner" meetings or rallies i.e. the main forms of party activity and outreach in the lead-up

to an election. (See Table 1.3 which documents these gaps in a survey sample of 800 households in Faisalabad, Pakistan). Although these patterns of women's exclusion from political activities, and underrepresentation in political positions are not unique to Pakistan, the size of the participation gap is especially pronounced in the Pakistani case. Figure 3.1 visualizes data from the most recent round of the World Values Survey, showing the gap between men and women who report turning out to vote in national elections in their respective countries: Pakistan fares the worst among democracies surveyed in this wave.

Figure 3.1: Gender Gaps in Self Reported Turnout, WVS Wave 6 (2010-14)




Issues of women's participation in electoral politics in Pakistan have sometimes been framed in terms of equity, insofar as equity issues are about "extend[ing] rights now enjoyed by other groups (men, other minorities) to women and which appear to be relatively delineated or narrow in their implications" (Gelb and Pal-

ley, 1982). This is true for the question of women's underrepresentation on electoral rolls and voter registration lists. Following the 2013 elections in Pakistan, civil society groups organized around the slogan of a "Women Voters Registration Emergency." While we would imagine that it would be in the interest of political parties to encourage women to register as voters and take on organizing registration drives, it is in fact the non-partisan Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) along with non-partisan civil society organizations who have taken the bulk of action. A clue that the issue of women's electoral participation was framed as one of equity rather than gender roles for this purpose, is that it has sometimes been grouped together with the participation of "other marginalized groups" e.g. the ECP created a "'Gender and Disability Electoral Working Group (GDEW)' with the aim of main streaming women and other marginalized group in to the political process"[1]; similarly for Election Day 2018, the ECP created a dedicated "Gender Desk" tasked with receiving complaints from "women, persons with Disabilities, transgender, minorities, female candidates, female polling staff and female polling agents" [2]. This suggests a consideration of the question of women's exclusion along with broader inequalities in the electorate, rather than approaching it in terms of the specific barriers (potentially gender-role related barriers) faced by women.

On the side of women's descriptive representation, Pakistan has had quotas for women in the form of reserved seats in local government bodies and in provincial and national legislatures. However, these reserved seats are mostly (except in some cases for local bodies) filled by indirect rather than direct election i.e. they are awarded to parties in proportion of the general unreserved seats won by the

[1]Election Commission of Pakistan. "Initiatives Taken by the Gender Affairs Wing, Election Commission of Pakistan", URL: `https://www.ecp.gov.pk/frmGenericPage.aspx?PageID=3171`

[2]Election Commission of Pakistan. "General Elections 2018: A Gender Desk has been set up for General Elections 2018 in the control room of ECP Secretariat", URL: `https://www.ecp.gov.pk/PrintDocument.aspx?PressId=65435&type=Text`

party in an election. Among other things, this means that women who fill these seats do not directly contest elections or have a "constituency of their own" (Mufti and Jalalzai, 2017). Importantly, it was not until 2017 that there was any legal provision for parties to fulfill *candidate* quotas for women. Htun (2004) documents the empirical pattern in institutions of mandated representation around the world: women generally receive candidate quotas and ethnic minorities receive legislative reservation. Pakistan, along with a few other cases, is a departure from that general pattern in that it provides women and religious minorities the same remedy of legislative reservations. Htun (2004) also draws an analytical distinction between these types of institutions, comparing candidate quotas for women to a "class action" and legislative reservations for ethnic minorities as a "group right": "Women seeking quotas aim to have their different position absorbed by universalistic institutions. Ethnic minorities demanding reservations want their particularism recognized and legitimized." One of the explanations for Pakistan's (and other countries') departure from the pattern described by Htun is historical legacies: "countries with traditions of ethnic reservations have given reserved seats to women." However, regardless of the origin, the design of the quota institution means that at least until 2017 women's descriptive representation in Pakistan was considered together with that of minorities, as an issue of group rights rather than one of assimilation of women into mainstream political parties. This conception and institutional design maps more closely to the framing of women's descriptive representation as an equity issue rather than one of role change. Candidate quotas which mandate parties to field women candidates to contest general seats, run public campaigns and cultivate a constituency of their own would ostensibly involve greater potential for role transformation for women than the institution of reserved seats, and as per Gelb and Palley (1982)'s expectation, be met with greater resistance.

These instances of women's political participation framed as questions of equity (i.e. in the case of voter registration drives and legislative reservations) are instances where initiatives actually took place or where policy exists. We might contrast this with instances where gender roles were in fact threatened or challenged in the domain of women's electoral participation. Most relevant is the 2017 Elections Act which for the first time required parties to field women candidates: Section 206 of the Act requires that when selecting candidates for general seats, parties "shall ensure at least five per cent representation of women candidates." Among other things, the requirement to field women as candidates implies that women would have to run public-facing campaigns targeted to voters, thus challenging norms of women's role in public space in a way that a women vying for an indirectly elected reserved seat who do not need to campaign for votes do not do. Parties minimally complied with this requirement i.e. all parties fielded the requisite five percent but very few exceeded this, and when they did it was minimally in excess of this requirement [3]. However, some parties evaded these public image implications of this requirement by quite literally keeping women candidates' faces off of campaign posters:

- "In Peshawar no one seems to know 'Ms Yasmeen', the candidate without a last name and without a face, the space is left blank on campaign posters" [4]
- "Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf's Syeda Zahra Basit Bokhari is running a very odd political campaign. Her election posters carry her name but her husband's picture" [5]

[3]Election Commission of Pakistan, Statement Showing the Five Percent Women in General Seats Under Section 206 of the Election Act, 2017. 6 July 2018, URL: `https://www.ecp.gov.pk/PrintDocument.aspx?PressId=55373&type=PDF`

[4]Jahangir, Munizae, "The invisible female candidates shut out of Pakistan's elections". The Guardian. 24 July 2018, URL: `https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2018/jul/24/female-candidates-pakistan-elections`

[5]Shah, Benazir. "A female candidate's faceless election campaign".

- "Recently, posters of a Member National Assembly (MNA) candidate Memoona Hamid contesting from PP-149 constituency of Pakistan came to light without her face on them." [6]

What these accounts demonstrate anecdotally is that equality in men and women's political participation has been, on occasion, constructed as an issue of equity. However, when women's participation constitutes a challenge to status quo roles, it is met with resistance. This is true across different types of participation i.e. we may think that certain activities like becoming a party worker or running for office – which involve long term engagement – challenge status quo gender roles moreso than others. However, it may also be true for the particular form that a certain type of participation takes due to institutional design e.g. women's descriptive representation and participation in the electoral arena as representatives through reserved seats may be more palatable than their representation through candidate quotas. In the following section, I demonstrate how this logic plays out in public attitudes towards women's participation specifically, how attitudes towards "appropriateness" of women's political participation are sensitive to the type of activity, and I argue, the extent to which that activity poses a challenge to gender roles.

## Attitudes towards Women's Political Participation

In an original survey[7] conducted with 2500 households in Lahore, Pakistan just prior to the 2018 National Elections in Pakistan, we ask male and female respon-

GEO News. 20 July 2018, URL: https://www.geo.tv/latest/203944-a-female-candidates-faceless-election-campaign

[6] "Pakistan General Elections 2018: Faces of women candidates missing from posters". India Today. July 23, 2018. URL: https://www.indiatoday.in/home-top/story/pakistan-general-elections-2018-faces-of-women-candidates-missing-from-posters-12

[7] Details of the survey are in Section 2.3

dents their opinion on how appropriate it is for women to participate in each of five types of political activities that are particularly salient at election time:

1. Voting
2. Discussing politics
3. Becoming a political worker
4. Attend a rally
5. Stand as a Candidate

The respondents can answer Appropriate, Neither Appropriate nor Inappropriate or Inappropriate. Figure 3.2 shows the proportion of male and female respondents who think it is appropriate for women to participate in each of 5 activities.

Despite the observed gender gap in voting, there appears to be near consensus among men and women that it is in fact *appropriate* for women to vote. Relative to becoming a political worker or standing as a candidate, which involve longer term and repeated engagement, voting is a "one-off" activity, and unlikely to alter the course of a women's life in the way that taking on a political career would. Moreover, voting usually takes place in separate polling booths for men and women, with female polling agents staffing the women's booths, ensuring that norms of gender segregation remain unviolated even as women are momentarily engaged in a public political activity [8]. The perceived appropriateness of becoming a political worker or a candidate, or even discussing politics, is lower among both men and women, with a significantly higher proportion of women than men thinking these activities are appropriate.

[8]The Election Commission of Pakistan sets up 3 types of polling stations: women's, men's and mixed. However in the case of mixed stations, men and women's polling *booths* within the station are always separate

Figure 3.2: Respondent Attitudes towards Appropriateness of Women's Political Participation, by type of participation and gender




Attending rallies seems to be the outlier, with only 13% and 17% of women and men respectively thinking it is an appropriate activity for women. This is puzzling given that it may seem similar to voting in that it is a short term, one-off form of engagement. While it does involves women's presence in public space in a way that may be circumvented in the case of voting (with separate polling booths, and stations), it is not immediately clear why it would be deemed less appropriate than women becoming political workers or candidates, which involves public engagement and exposure over a longer time. The reason is at least in part context specific: women's participation at rallies in particular received a lot of negative media coverage in the lead-up to the 2018 election. While women's presence at political rallies is not an anomaly, in the lead-up to the 2018 elections, there were at least four highly

publicized instances of harassment of women attendees at rallies for a major political party (the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf (PTI)) in Islamabad, Lahore, Multan and Peshawar [9] [10].

One of the most serious incidents occurred in a rally held in Lahore in 2016, which is where this survey was conducted. On the one hand, PTI leadership blamed party workers of the incumbent party (Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz - PML-N), for example in the case of harassment at a rally in Peshawar, a PTI legislator alleged that the harassed woman herself was a PML-N party worker: "PTI leader Naeem ul Haq while speaking to Geo News shifted the blame on political opponents and said that the woman was sent by them to create this situation"[11]. On the other hand, the PML-N leadership responded by victim-blaming the women at the rally. Most egregiously, the then prime minister Nawaz Sharif made a public statement made a statement to this effect saying: "Did you see what women were doing in yesterday's gathering?" and later, addressing women at a PML-N rally stated: "'Thankfully you are not like the women who attend PTI rallies" [12]. Another legislator from the PML-N Rana Sanaullah said (of women participating in PTI rallies): "The dance moves of these women show which kind of families they belong to" [13].

Thus, at the time the survey was conducted, rally attendance by women was a highly charged topic, and had been framed by the incumbent government in terms of women's character and appropriate roles. Burns and Gallagher (2010) note that

[9] "Several booked for harassing PTI women". DAWN News. 03 May 2016. URL: https://www.dawn.com/news/1255929

[10] "Another incident of female harassment at PTI rally". The News International. 09 May 2016. URL: https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/118633-incident-female-harassment-PTI-Pakistan

[11] "Another incident of female harassment at PTI rally". The News International. 09 May 2016. URL: https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/118633-incident-female-harassment-PTI-Pakistan

[12] Sexism Tracker in Pakistan Politics, Geo News. URL: https://www.geo.tv/latest/235668-sexism-tracker-in-pakistani-politics

[13] Ibid

"scholars have have begun to think, for example, about three kinds of context as activators of gendered predispositions," one of these are contexts in which political parties prime gender thinking. Although the question of women's participation in all types of activities is an explicitly gendered issue, rally attendance is an example of an activity where parties in Pakistan purposively framed women's participation in terms of gendered norms of appropriate behavior.

## Sensitivity of Attitudes to Role Threat

The case of unusually low agreement on rally attendance (relative to other forms of public political participation, including ones that would be far more costly in terms of time) as appropriate behavior for women is an example of how parties can frame a particular domain or activity as a threat to gender roles. In this section, I draw on survey questions about specific circumstances (not related to party framing) surrounding women's voting to demonstrate that even on an activity where there is consensus on appropriateness among men and women (96% of women and 92% of men think it is appropriate for women to vote), this consensus is sensitive to particular situations where women's role may be threatened. Anecdotally, we know extreme instances of women being banned from voting altogether in Pakistan[14]. Additionally, changes in procedural details that threaten women's exposure in public space can also depress women's turnout: in recent 2019 elections held in the previously Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan which are now merged into the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province, there were reports of women coming to polling stations, but ending up not voting due to closed-circuit TV cameras in polling stations, and an aversion to being filmed. To explore this systematically within the survey sample, we first ask respondents about whether they think voting is appropriate for women, and then ask whether it is appropriate for men to

[14]see Section 1.3 for a full discussion of these constraints)

*stop or prevent* women from voting under any of the following circumstances:

1. Women are expected to vote differently than men
2. Long lines are expected on polling day
3. Voting interferes with women's household duties
4. Fights are expected to break out on polling day

These conditions/circumstances were selected based on topics that came up in exploratory focus group discussions and interviews with men and women in Lahore. The first represents the possibility of women's autonomous voting, which may pose a greater threat to women's roles than would women simply "doubling" men's vote. The second speaks both to different time constraints for men and women on polling day – while election day is a public holiday, women are of course not free from usual housework on election day and may thus be less available to wait a long time to vote. Moreover, long lines often mean that women have to stand outside the polling station itself in a public space rather than the enclosed gender segregated area of a polling booth. Interference with household duties is a direct statement of part of what is implied in the second condition of long lines and women's inability to pass on duties of childcare and housework to others on polling day in order to vote. The final condition relates to security concerns, which may be a greater constraint on women's participation than men's, in part due to masculine norms of protection. Figure 3.3 shows the proportion of male and female respondents who think it is appropriate for men to *stop* women from voting under each of these circumstances.

For each of these conditions a substantial proportion of respondents i.e. at least 18% agree that is it appropriate for men to stop women from voting. This is far higher than the proportion who think it is inappropriate for women to vote at

Figure 3.3: Respondent Attitudes towards Appropriateness of Men Stopping Women From Voting, by situation and gender




all (8% of men think this, see Figure 3.2. Moreover, for each condition – except the threat to security – there is a gender gap in perception of appropriateness i.e. women are more likely to say it is inappropriate for men to stop women from voting. These patterns reveal the breakdown of an abstract consensus on the appropriateness of a particular type of participation in the face of concrete threats to gender norms of behavior and presence in public space.

## 3.4 Girls' Schooling in Pakistan

### Equity or Roles?

Most countries around the world have achieved gender parity in primary education (as measured by the ratio of girls to boys enrollment) in recent years, with girls'

enrollment exceeding that of boys in some contexts. Cross-country data shows that gender gaps in enrollment tend to close as countries develop economically:

> There is a pronounced male bias in educational attainment at low levels of economic development, which is absent among richer societies [...] The pattern seen in the cross-section of countries is also seen over time in most poor countries as their economies grow: girls' education increases at a faster rate than boys', narrowing the gender gap. (Heath and Jayachandran, 2018)

School enrollment rates for girls and boys have risen in Pakistan in recent years. However, gender gaps in enrollment do persist at the primary school level, are exacerbated at the secondary school level, and exist alongside gender gaps in learning and achievement even when girls are in school (*Annual Status of Education Report 2018*, 2019). Public attitudes towards girls' education seem largely supportive. In 2014, following the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to then seventeen year old Malala Yousafzai for her advocacy of girls' education in Pakistan, Pew publicized results from its Global Attitudes Survey with the headline: "Most Pakistanis agree with Malala on educating girls" (Wike 2014). In a nationally representative survey, they find that 86% of respondents agree that education is equally important for both girls and boys, and that this consensus holds among men and women respondents alike.

Existing evidence suggests that education can be transformative in girls' lives in the developing world: Heath and Jayachandran (2018) document the effects on increased labor market participation, delayed marriage and delayed fertility. These are certainly the sort of changes that could be considered a threat to status quo gender roles in the context of Pakistan. However, this may be more true of secondary-level and university level schooling. Even at the primary level, some campaigns for the promotion of girls' education have taken a role-consistent tone i.e. emphasizing the gains to the "family" or society of educating girls rather than focusing on the

potential for the transformation of the lives of girls themselves [15]. In a recent study of parental preferences for girls' education in rural Rajasthan, India, Adams and Andrew (2019) find that a key motivation for parents for investing girls' higher education is the expectation that this will yield returns (in terms of a desirable match) on the marriage market: "This insight is likely important in explaining why access to education, girls' completed education, and age of marriage have all increased substantially over the past 20 years." This trend reflects a motivation for girls' education that is congruent with traditional gender roles: it may explain support for higher education that could regardless result in role change in the long run, but is not perceived by parents as doing so. In this way, if education is framed as and understood to be congruent with rather than challenging gender roles (regardless of whether it actually is), we may be likely to see high public support for equality, and the existing gaps in enrollment interpreted as a question of equity rather than roles.

Given steady trends of increasing girls enrollment and the potential for understanding education even at higher levels as role-congruent rather than role-changing, and high general public support for equality in this domain, we may think that remaining gaps in enrollment and achievement are likely to be perceived as issues of equity. However, research on the *causes* of the gender gap in enrollment points to factors that implicate gender roles. For instance, Andrabi et al. (2008) trace how distance from a school affects girls and boys differently:

> [...]every additional 500 meters increase in the distance to the closest school results in a large drop in enrollment, and more so for girls living 500 meters from the school are 15 percentage points less likely to attend than those living next door. The drop-off is much smaller for boys, and

[15]These gains are not imaginary – there is a vast literature documenting the returns of mothers' education on a host of outcomes for children; a recent paper documents how "the oldest sister's schooling significantly improves younger brothers' literacy, numeracy and schooling" in Pakistan (Qureshi, 2018)

> in fact, distance to school accounts for the bulk of the gender differential in enrollment in Pakistan. (Andrabi et al., 2008)

The gendered nature of distance as a constraint for school-going age girls speaks to the relevance of gender roles for the question of access to education: even if obtaining education itself (at least at primary levels) is not seen as a threat to gender roles and rather a question of equity, the exposure to public spaces and perceived threat of harassment involved in traveling *to* the physical school involves concerns around roles and appropriateness. While constraints on *adult* women's mobility are more commonly documented in this particular context [16], it seems that similar constraints apply to girls as early as primary school age. In addition, Jacoby (2011) show how, in rural Pakistan, it is social, and not just physical distance that matters: "Entry into primary school is substantially discouraged when girls have to cross settlement boundaries to attend, irrespective of the distance they would have to travel." This again points to the primacy of contextual gender roles, whereby women (and girls') mobility is additionally constrained by the threat of loss of status from crossing a village boundary.

Given that the role-related constraint has to do with *access* to schooling rather than the effects of schooling itself, I would expect individuals who support girls' schooling to also support measures that could overcome these constraints e.g. better transportation for girls or more girls schools in their neighborhood to enable easier access. In the following section, I draw on survey evidence to explore public attitudes towards girls schooling and such policy initiatives.

[16] Mumtaz and Salway (2005) examines how this affects women's uptake of reproductive health services

## Attitudes towards Equality and Support for Concrete Policy Measures

I draw on a survey conducted in the Faisalabad District of Punjab, Pakistan in 2017 with 800 respondents (400 married men and 400 married women)[17] in which respondents are asked the following questions about their views on the importance of education:

- Girls' primary education is just as important as boys' education. To what extent do you agree with this statement?
- Primary education aside, girls' higher education is just as important as boys' education. To what extent do you agree with this statement?

For both statements, respondents can choose to Strongly Agree, Somewhat Agree, Somewhat Disagree or Strongly Disagree. Figure 3.4 shows the results in terms of proportions of respondents who strongly or somewhat agree with the statements: there appears to be high consensus over the principle of equal importance of education for girls and boys, shared among men and women, for primary as well as higher education. However, it is worth noting that the support for equal importance of higher education is significantly (though perhaps not substantively) lower than for primary in the case of male, but not female, respondents.

Does the high support for equal importance of girls' education translate into support for the kind of policy measures that would produce equal outcomes? Given different baseline levels of enrollment, efforts to close the gap would have to involve measures that specifically target girls enrollment rather than universal measures that aim to improve everyone's enrollment. In the survey, respondents are asked

[17]Sampling details for the survey can be found in Appendix A.2

Figure 3.4: Respondent Attitudes towards importance of schooling for girls and boys, by level of schooling and gender




if they think the government should should prioritize them over more universal measures. The exact question wording is as follows:

- There are some things that the provincial govt. can do to improve enrollment for **everyone**, like improving existing schools' infrastructure, making sure teachers are attending There are other things that the govt. can do to improve the enrollment of **girls** like girls stipend programs, building more girls schools, providing better transport. Which do you think the govt. should prioritize?[18] [Things that improve everyone's enrollment / Things that improve girls' enrollment]

Two of the three measures (building more girls schools and providing better transport) mentioned as ones that would increase girls enrollment specifically address the distance constraint which is considered key in explaining the gender gap. The other measure: a girls stipend program is a pre-existing scheme (Female School

[18] All these are examples of actions taken by the provincial government in the past

Stipend Program - FSSP) introduced by the Punjab government in 2003 which provides a conditional cash transfer to families of girls who regularly attend middle school. While the survey question phrasing might imply an overly strict tradeoff (improving things for everyone or just for girls), it accurately reflects the the kinds of trade-offs over distribution and prioritization governments make when deciding how to allocate resources: in the case of Khyber Pakthunkhwa (a province with especially large gaps in enrollment), a provincial government official made an pre-budget announcement committing 70% of the provincial education budget to girls education in May 2019. The party now in power – the Pakistan Tehrik-i-Insaf (PTI) included the following language in their 2018 national manifesto: "We will prioritise establishment and upgradation of girls' schools and provide stipends to girls and women for continuing their education" (PTI Manifesto, 2018); the manifestos of the main opposition parties the Pakistan Muslim League - Nawaz (PML-N)[19] and the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)[20] also included specific measures for girls' education. Do these political commitments enjoy public support?

Figure 3.5[21] shows the results from the survey question. There is overall very low support for prioritizing measures that would exclusively target girls enrollment over universal measures, and there does not appear to be a difference among men and women respondents on this issue.

[19]The PML-N manifesto states: a "promise" to "ensure equitable access to education for girls'

[20]The PPP manifesto states: "In order to increase retention of students beyond primary level, particularly that of girls, primary schools will be upgraded to at least lower secondary level. In addition, more resources will be allocated for girls' education, and stipends will be awarded to girls to complete secondary school and HSSC"

[21]Note that Figure 3.5 only visualizes data collected from respondents who do not receive the information treatment described in Section 3.4

Figure 3.5: Respondent stated support for prioritizing targeted measures that improve girls enrollment over universal measures, by gender




## Perceptions of Inequality and Policy Attitudes

What might explain the disconnect between overall agreement on the equal importance of girls education, and the lack of support for measures that could potentially produce equality in this domain? The trend in public opinion appears to parallel Mansbridge's assessment of American's support for the *principle* of equal rights, without support for any concrete change in the status quo. Here, however, the proposed policies I ask about are not geared towards a broader transformation of roles, but quite narrow and tied to the specific outcome of equality, over which there is prima facie consensus between men and women (i.e. following a logic of equity rather than roles as per Gelb and Palley (1982)).

One possibility for lack of support for policy might be that while there is genuine support for equality in this domain, respondents do not think there is a *need* for such policy to produce equal outcomes. They may value equal outcomes in schooling for girls and boys, but either think that existing gaps will close over time

on their own without government intervention, and/or they might misperceive the level of pre-existing equality and think that the status-quo is not unequal. To explore the potential of misperception of inequality, I ask respondents the following question about perceived levels of inequality:

- Do you think more girls go to school than boys in Punjab? [More girls go to school/Equal numbers of girls and boys/Fewer girls go to school]

Figure 3.6 shows the distribution of responses. Most respondents underestimate the level of inequality: contrary to reality on ground, a plurality thinks that either *more* girls are in school than boys, or that enrollment numbers are equal.

Figure 3.6: Respondent (mis)perceptions of existing gaps in enrollment




There may be a number of reasons why so many respondents misperceive the level of inequality in enrollment at the provincial level. First is a possibility that the question is interpreted to be about attendance rather than enrollment. While I do not have data on gender gaps in school attendance it is possible that this gap is smaller than the gap in enrollment. Second, a steady trend of increase in girls' enrollment (as described in Section 3.4) may lead respondents to think that equality

has already been achieved [22]. Third, it may be the case that (some) respondents are incorrectly extrapolating a situation of relative equality in their local environment to the provincial level – the district (Faislabad) in which this survey was conducted performs especially well compared to other districts in the country on overall educational outcomes, and on gender parity in these outcomes[23]. Finally, respondents' views of equality in outcomes may be driven by their attitudes towards gender equality more broadly, and other predispositions. For instance, in the case of the United States, perceptions of progress towards equality are heavily partisan: Republicans are far more likely than Democrats to say that women have it easier than men (or that there is no difference) today in the United States (Horowitz, Parker and Stepler, 2017).

Given the broad misperceptions of levels of inequality in this domain, the low support for initiatives promoting girls' schooling are perhaps unsurprising: respondents simply do not see a need for policy redressal of inequality. Are respondents' who accurately perceive the existence inequality in this domain more likely to support policy that prioritizes girls' enrollment? Figure 3.7[24] shows the distribution of policy support by perception of level of inequality, and gender.

For women, the highest levels of support for prioritizing measures for girls en-

[22]We can observe similar trends in American survey respondents' views of the current state of gender equality: when asked whether men or women have it easier today in the United States, 9% of respondents say that women have it easier and a majority (56%) say that there is no difference; when asked about whether more work is needed to bring about gender equality in the United States, 39% say that the country has been "about right" and 10% say it has gone too far when it comes to giving equal rights to women. An important distinction is that these questions are about general progress towards equality rather than a domain specific question about progress towards a specific outcome, but it illustrates a somewhat similar phenomenon

[23]Alif Ailaan, an education non-profit, produces an annual ranking of districts based on how well they perform on indicators of education. They calculate a gender parity score for each district based on 1) Total girls enrollment as percentage of boys enrollment 2) Girls retention from primary to middle school as a percentage of boys retention from primary to middle and 3) Girls retention from middle school to high school as percentage of boys retention. Faisalabad ranked 2nd highest among 158 districts in 2017

[24]Note that Figure 3.7 only visualizes data collected from respondents who do not receive the information treatment described in Section 3.4

Figure 3.7: Respondent stated support for prioritizing targeted measures that improve girls enrollment over universal measures, by perceived level of inequality and gender




rollment (36%) are among the women who (accurately) think that fewer girls are enrolled in school than boys in their province. Support among women who underestimate the level of inequality i.e. think that enrollment is equal or that *more* girls go to school than boys is relatively lower (21% and 25% respectively). This pattern is consistent with the idea that respondents who are generally supportive of the principle of equality (and almost all women agree that education is equally important for girls and boys) would be more likely to demand policies that promote equal outcomes if they think there is a greater need for them (i.e. if they think that real outcomes are in fact unequal). However, this is not the case for men. Only 11% of men who (accurately) think that fewer girls are enrolled in school than boys in their province are supportive of initiatives that could redress this inequality, this is not substantively different from the men who (inaccurately) think that more girls are enrolled in school than boys (9% of whom support such measures). The highest support (25%) is among men who think the status quo is actually equal. It is only in

this category that men's support is as high as that of women. While it is difficult to make inferences from these simple distributions, the patterns are suggestive of the idea that the relationship between perceptions of gendered inequality and support for policy measures may look different for women and men.

## Can Accurate Information about Levels of Inequality Shift Policy Support?

Perceptions of levels of inequality may themselves be driven by attitudes and predispositions that predict support for equalizing policy measures, as apparent from the case of partisan biases in the perception of gender inequality in the United States (Horowitz, Parker and Stepler, 2017). Thus, to better identify the relationship between perceptions and support, I embed a randomized informational treatment in the survey in which a random half of survey respondents are provided information about actual levels of school enrollment in their province before being asked about their support for measures that would promote girls enrollment[25]. The information treatment is as follows:

- "Actually, in Punjab, more boys go to school than girls. 8 million (80 lakh[26]) boys between the age of 5 and 16 are enrolled in school, compared to just 6.7 million girls (67 lakh). There is a difference of nearly 13 lakh."

Do respondents accurately update their perceptions in response to this information? To assess this, I ask the respondents who receive the information treatment the following question as a manipulation check:

[25]Note that Figures 3.5 and 3.7 in the sections above only visualize data collected from respondents who did not receive this information treatment (the control group)

[26]*Lakh/Lac* is one hundred thousand units

- Is this gap, larger than what you thought, smaller than what you thought or about the same?

If the information treatment works, we would expect respondents who previously answered that more or equal numbers of boys and girls go to school to respond that the gap is in fact larger than what they thought. For those who accurately answered that fewer girls go to school, any of the response options could indicate "accurate" updating depending on their prior perception of the exact size of the gap (which I do not collect data on).

I find that among the respondents who initially said that more girls go to school and then received the treatment, 73% respond that this gap in enrollment is larger than what they thought; for respondents who initially thought enrollment was equal, 77% respond that the gap is larger than what they thought after receiving the information. Among respondents who accurately reported thinking that fewer girls go to school, 47% respond that the gap is larger than what they thought and 36% respond that it is about the same as they initially thought after receiving the information. By and large, respondents seem to update in the expected direction given their prior perception after receiving accurate information.

Table 3.1 shows results from regressions of reported support for prioritizing measures for girls enrollment (the dependent variable is coded 1 if respondent chooses "Things that improve girls' enrollment", and 0 if the respondent chooses "Things that improve everyone's enrollment") on a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent received the randomized informational treatment. The first column shows the simple bivariate relationship controlling for respondent gender; all models include settlement fixed effects [27], the second third and fourth models include an indicator for whether the respondent (mis)perceived the status-quo as being one

[27]These are added to account for the settlement level factors that may affect respondents' perception of inequality e.g. one area may have more/less girls' schools

where more or equal numbers of girls are enrolled in school, and an interaction of the information treatment with these pre-treatment perceptions. The omitted category is the respondents in the control condition (who do not receive the treatment) and who accurately perceive that fewer girls go to school in the Punjab province. Figure 3.8 graphs the coefficients from the third and fourth column (separate models for female and male respondents)

Table 3.1: Effects of Accurate Information on Support for Initiatives for Girls' Schooling

| | (1) Pooled b/se | (2) Pooled b/se | (3) Women b/se | (4) Men b/se |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Female | 0.040 | 0.044 | | |
| | (0.028) | (0.028) | | |
| Info Treatment | 0.014 | 0.045 | -0.192* | 0.139* |
| | (0.028) | (0.065) | (0.116) | (0.075) |
| Perception: Equal Nos | | 0.027 | -0.131 | 0.112 |
| | | (0.059) | (0.094) | (0.074) |
| Perception: More Girls | | -0.053 | -0.162* | 0.041 |
| | | (0.056) | (0.089) | (0.069) |
| Equal*InfoTreat | | -0.014 | 0.239* | -0.123 |
| | | (0.082) | (0.136) | (0.103) |
| MoreGirls*InfoTreat | | -0.059 | 0.112 | -0.060 |
| | | (0.077) | (0.131) | (0.093) |
| Constant | 0.133** | 0.154** | 0.346*** | 0.038 |
| | (0.060) | (0.072) | (0.110) | (0.091) |
| Settlement FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.030 | 0.044 | 0.068 | 0.136 |
| # Observations | 800.000 | 800.000 | 400.000 | 400.000 |

* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Figure 3.8: Effects of Accurate Information on Support for Initiatives for Girls' Schooling




The results from the pooled regression models (Model 1 and Model 2) do not support that the informational treatment about true levels of gender gaps in school enrollment had any effects on respondents' support for initiatives that would support girls' enrollment, even when we account for respondents' pre-treatment perceptions of the gender gap (Model 2). However, the separate models for female (Model 3) and male respondents (Model 4) reveal different patterns. Among women, the informational treatment has a significant *negative* effect when delivered to the respondents who correctly perceived a gender gap (in favor of boys) in the status quo levels of school enrollment before receiving the treatment. The relationship we observe in 3.7 is reflected in the coefficients on (mis)perception of status quo equality or a (mis)perception that the status quo enrollment is skewed in favor of girls: these (mis)perceptions are correlated with lower levels of support for

initiatives promoting girls enrollment. When delivered to the women who underestimate gender inequality in enrollment, the informational treatment appears to have a positive effect – although this is only statistically significant for the women who misperceive the status quo as being equal. In the case of men, the exact opposite patterns seems to hold true. Among men, the informational treatment has a significant *positive* effect when delivered to the respondents who correctly perceived a gender gap (in favor of boys) in the status quo levels of school enrollment. Unlike women, men who misperceive the level of inequality (either perceive that there is status equality, or that the situation is skewed in favor of girls) are no more likely (and if anything *less* likely) to support initiatives that promote girls enrollment when they receive accurate information that goes against their priors.

It seems that although 1) both men and women in this sample are in consensus on the abstract idea that education is equally important for boys and girls (Figure 3.4)) that this support for equality in the abstract nevertheless does not translate into high support for the kind of policy measures that would actually achieve equal outcomes in this domain (Figure 3.5), the factors that might lead men and women to support concrete measures might be different. Specifically, for women, learning about the true level of inequality in this particular domain and updating their beliefs about the status quo seems to translate into greater support for inequality-reducing measures. This is not true for men, even though information about the true level of inequality leads them to update their beliefs about these levels, it does not make them more supportive of inequality-reducing measures. The men who accurately perceive a gender gap in the status quo to begin with, are in fact even more likely to increase support for policy initiatives when reminded of these true levels, even if it does not involve updating their prior beliefs.

Exploring *why* information about the true extent of gender inequality has different effects on men and women's policy preference – particularly in a domain

where there is relative agreement that equality is desirable at least in the abstract – is beyond the scope of this paper. However, simply documenting that this gendered response to information exists is potentially valuable. First, it is possible that men and women's prior beliefs about the status quo are driven by different factors, that may or may not also inform their policy preferences. For instance, if women's beliefs about the level are informed mostly by knowledge while men's beliefs are informed not just by knowledge but also some other predispositions towards equality, new information about levels may not be sufficient to effect change in the latter's policy preferences.

## 3.5 Discussion

There are well-documented gender gaps around the world in access, participation and outcomes across a number of social, economic and political domains ranging from primary education, to the labor market and electoral politics. These gaps are are particularly stark in Pakistan, a country that ranks 148th out of 149 countries on the Global Gender Gap Index. In this paper I focus on two domains: electoral politics and education and demonstrate how these gaps may be understood through the framework of gender equity and gender role concerns.

Public attitudes towards women's political participation vary across specific forms of participation i.e. activities that pose a challenge to gender roles enjoy lower support and perception of appropriateness than do activities such as voting, that may be undertaken in a "role-coherent" manner. Nevertheless, even for a certain activity type, there is variation in perception of appropriateness based on whether the circumstances surrounding it potentially challenge gender roles e.g. if women's voting leads to neglect of household duties, or exposure in public space. Importantly the perception of the extent to which an activity is considered role-

coherent is manipulable and context specific, as seen in the case of unusually low support for women's participation in rallies.

In the case of education, an issue more likely to follow the logic of equity, I find that perception of levels of inequality seems to matter for individuals' support for policy redressal of inequities in education access. However, the effect of perceptions of levels of inequality varies for men and women, suggesting that the may be a gendered response on issues of equity. This finding speaks to Burns and Gallagher (2010) prediction that there is usually more of a gender gap on issues that are often more strongly about roles than equity. While I do not find a gender gap in support for policy redressal of inequality in enrollment, I do find a gender gap in the extent to which this support is responsive to new information about levels of pre-existing equality.

Public attitudes towards questions of gender equality in different domains are most often either considered as a unified set of attitude towards gender equality (e.g. they are combined in something akin to an equality index), or separately by issue domain. The roles and equity framework is an alternative to this treatment and provides a common lens through which to understand attitudes towards equality and make predictions within and across issue domains.

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Appendix A

# Appendices to Chapter 1

# A.1 Punjab Local Government Act, Chapter II, Parts 9 & 10

**9. Delimitation of Union Councils**

(1) A Union Council shall be an area consisting of one or more revenue estates or, in the case of an area where revision of settlement under the law has not taken place, one or more census villages or, in the case of an urban area, a census block or blocks as determined for purposes of the last preceding census or a census block or blocks and a revenue estate or revenue estates, delimited and notified as such by the Election Commission.

(2) For purposes of delimitation of a Union Council:
(a) the area of a Union Council shall be a territorial unity;
(b) the boundaries of a Union Council shall not cross the limits of the Metropolitan Corporation, a Municipal Corporation or a District Council; and
(c) the population of Union Councils within a local government shall, as far as possible, be uniform.

(3) The Election Commission shall delimit a Union Council into six wards for the election of members on the general seats.]

(4) For purposes of delimitation of a ward of a Union Council:
(a) a ward shall consist of a village, one or more adjoining villages or, in case of an urban area, a census block or adjoining census blocks;
(b) the boundaries of a ward shall not cross the limits of the Union Council; and
(c) the population of wards within a Union Council shall, as far as possible, be uniform.]

**10. Delimitation of wards in Municipal Committees**

1) The Election Commission shall delimit a Municipal Committee into wards for election of members of the Municipal Committee on general seats.

(2) For purposes of delimitation of a Municipal Committee:
(a) a ward shall consist of a census block or adjoining census blocks;
(b) the boundaries of a ward shall not cross the limits of the Municipal Committee; and
(c) the population of wards within a Municipal Committee shall, as far as possible, be uniform.

## A.2 Household Sampling Procedure

This describes the sampling procedure used to select 50 households within an electoral block/ward:

- Locate the following 5 predetermined landmarks in the dwelling
  - Health (BHU, if none, select dispensary, if none, select pvt. clinic)
  - Education (largest govt. primary school, if none, select largest pvt. primary school)
  - Mosque (main mosque)
  - Main Market area
  - Transformer
- Begin with any of these landmarks, use the right hand rule select every 3rd household until 10 households are surveyed. So, e.g. start at the main market area, begin to walk right and select household #3, #6, #9, #12, #15, #18, #21, #24, #27, #30
- Again, male and female enumerators are to alternate so that male enumerators takes #3, #9, #15, #21, #27 and female enumerators takes #6, #12, #18, #24, #30 (or the other way around). The gender alternation is crucial otherwise one-gender surveys will be non-randomly clustered.
- After 10 households from the first landmark using the rule have been completed, go to the next landmark and repeat the procedure.
- By the end 50 households will be selected in this way randomly taking 10 households starting from all 5 landmarks
- If no one can be interviewed at the randomly selected household e.g. dwelling is empty, no one was available, selected person did not provide consent, then select the neighboring dwelling immediately to the LEFT of the selected dwelling

Appendix B

# Appendices to Chapter 2

# B.1 Intervention Materials

Figure B.1: Procedural Information Leaflet



Figure B.2: Political Knowledge Leaflet

Figure B.3: Mock Ballot Paper



## B.2 Design of Costly Behavioral Measure

Male respondents were randomly selected into being offered one of the two stickers. If the respondent agreed, the enumerator placed the sticker on the entry-way to the respondent's residence. The Urdu text on the sticker at the top translates to: "Strong Democracy, Strong Pakistan" x 2. The Urdu text on the bottom sticker translates to "Strong Democracy, Strong Pakistan" and "Democracy is incomplete without the inclusion of women."

Figure B.4: Stickers offered to Male Respondents



# B.3 Additional Tables

Table B.1: Results: Channels

| | (1) Political Knowledge | (2) Interest in Politics | (3) Women's Self Efficacy | (4) Logistic Help from Men | (5) Political Discussion | (6) Norm Perception |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | -0.027 | 0.021 | -0.013 | -0.009 | 0.015 | -0.015 |
| | (0.042) | (0.049) | (0.057) | (0.053) | (0.026) | (0.060) |
| T2 | -0.044 | 0.039 | -0.009 | -0.014 | 0.021 | -0.004 |
| | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.059) | (0.055) | (0.025) | (0.066) |
| T3 | -0.077 | 0.086* | 0.030 | 0.165*** | 0.064** | -0.045 |
| | (0.047) | (0.050) | (0.060) | (0.057) | (0.026) | (0.061) |
| Within T Control | -0.034 | 0.027 | 0.011 | 0.084* | 0.024 | 0.007 |
| | (0.042) | (0.043) | (0.052) | (0.050) | (0.023) | (0.056) |
| Constant | -0.231* | 0.084 | -0.358*** | 0.465*** | 0.467*** | -0.001 |
| | (0.131) | (0.130) | (0.119) | (0.105) | (0.047) | (0.165) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.074 | 0.103 | 0.079 | 0.120 | 0.077 | 0.143 |
| # Observations | 4866 | 4869 | 4864 | 4812 | 4754 | 4868 |

*Notes*: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the ward level. All columns show results using OLS estimation. All outcomes are standardized indices, except for column (1) and column (6). Column (1) is an indicator variables for whether the respondent stated their household received a visit from a non-partisan mobilizer in the days leading up to the election. Column (6) is an indicator variable for whether men (women) stated they discussed politics with a household member of the opposite gender. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B.2: Results: Channels with baseline controls

| | (1) Political Knowledge | (2) Interest in Politics | (3) Women's Self Efficacy | (4) Logistic Help from Men | (5) Political Discussion | (6) Norm Perception |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1 | -0.016 | 0.033 | -0.005 | -0.006 | 0.015 | -0.005 |
| | (0.043) | (0.050) | (0.056) | (0.053) | (0.026) | (0.058) |
| T2 | -0.054 | 0.041 | -0.002 | -0.012 | 0.027 | -0.002 |
| | (0.048) | (0.048) | (0.058) | (0.055) | (0.025) | (0.066) |
| T3 | -0.089* | 0.068 | 0.030 | 0.162*** | 0.063** | -0.055 |
| | (0.049) | (0.049) | (0.059) | (0.057) | (0.026) | (0.061) |
| Within T Control | -0.028 | 0.029 | 0.018 | 0.085* | 0.025 | 0.013 |
| | (0.043) | (0.043) | (0.051) | (0.050) | (0.023) | (0.056) |
| Constant | -0.048 | 0.246** | -0.334*** | 0.502*** | 0.431*** | 0.062 |
| | (0.105) | (0.099) | (0.122) | (0.100) | (0.045) | (0.152) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.172 | 0.205 | 0.090 | 0.124 | 0.084 | 0.175 |
| # Observations | 4866 | 4869 | 4864 | 4812 | 4754 | 4868 |

*Notes*: Standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the ward level. All outcomes are standardized indices, except for column (1) and column (6). Column (1) is an indicator variables for whether the respondent stated their household received a visit from a non-partisan mobilizer in the days leading up to the election. Column (6) is an indicator variable for whether men (women) stated they discussed politics with a household member of the opposite gender. Additionally, controls for demographic variables and baseline measures of political knowledge, interest in politics, women's self-efficacy and political discussions between men and women in the household are included. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B.3: Treatment Effects on Political Knowledge

| | Panel A: Women's Knowledge | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) **ECP Phone** | (2) **Election Days** | (3) **Voter Signature** | (4) **PO Signature** | (5) **Party Slogans** |
| T1 | -0.036 | -0.038 | 0.007 | -0.072** | 0.019 |
| | (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.070) |
| T2 | -0.041 | -0.017 | 0.020 | -0.060* | -0.031 |
| | (0.027) | (0.031) | (0.030) | (0.032) | (0.075) |
| T3 | -0.006 | -0.028 | 0.030 | -0.070** | -0.072 |
| | (0.029) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.030) | (0.071) |
| Within T Control | -0.042 | 0.014 | 0.052* | -0.042 | -0.059 |
| | (0.028) | (0.030) | (0.031) | (0.032) | (0.073) |
| Constant | 0.186*** | 0.337*** | 0.861*** | 0.090*** | -0.948** |
| | (0.070) | (0.130) | (0.073) | (0.033) | (0.375) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.125 | 0.248 | 0.096 | 0.155 | 0.230 |
| # Observations | 2423 | 2421 | 2408 | 2417 | 2428 |
| | **Panel B: Men's Knowledge** | | | | |
| T1 | 0.071** | -0.028* | 0.001 | -0.085** | 0.031 |
| | (0.031) | (0.014) | (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.031) |
| T2 | 0.086*** | -0.003 | -0.019 | -0.045 | 0.019 |
| | (0.031) | (0.011) | (0.035) | (0.037) | (0.031) |
| T3 | 0.057* | 0.004 | -0.028 | -0.051 | -0.018 |
| | (0.031) | (0.011) | (0.036) | (0.037) | (0.037) |
| Within T Control | 0.027 | -0.015 | -0.002 | -0.055 | 0.006 |
| | (0.032) | (0.014) | (0.033) | (0.035) | (0.035) |
| Constant | 0.710*** | 1.011*** | 0.567*** | 0.531*** | 0.606*** |
| | (0.172) | (0.010) | (0.170) | (0.083) | (0.028) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.203 | 0.083 | 0.263 | 0.219 | 0.146 |
| # Observations | 2427 | 2433 | 2413 | 2431 | 2433 |

*Notes*: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All columns show results using OLS estimation. All five outcomes used in this table are combined in a standardized index to form the outcome variable for Column (1) of Table 2.7. Outcome for column (1) is an indicator for whether the respondent correctly repeated the Election Commission of Pakistan SMS short-code for checking one's voter registration. Column (2) is an indicator for whether the respondent correctly stated that elections for provincial and national assemblies take place on the same day (as opposed to different days). Column (3) is an indicator for whether the respondent correctly stated that a voter's signature is not required on the ballot paper. Column (4) is an indicator for whether the respondent correctly stated that a Presiding Officer's signature are required on the ballot paper. Column (5) is a standardized index comprising of four variables, each being an indicator for whether the respondent correctly linked a popular political slogan with a political party. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B.4: Treatment Effects on Interest in Politics

| | **Panel A: Women's Interest** | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) **Interest in Political TV** | (2) **Interest in Political Issues** | (3) **Interest in Election 2018** |
| T1 | 0.038 | 0.051 | -0.039 |
| | (0.054) | (0.053) | (0.067) |
| T2 | 0.026 | 0.118** | 0.061 |
| | (0.048) | (0.050) | (0.067) |
| T3 | 0.045 | 0.095* | -0.060 |
| | (0.051) | (0.051) | (0.066) |
| Within T Control | 0.012 | 0.043 | -0.029 |
| | (0.048) | (0.049) | (0.065) |
| Constant | -0.117* | -0.245*** | -0.602** |
| | (0.063) | (0.059) | (0.296) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.293 | 0.260 | 0.142 |
| # Observations | 2435 | 2435 | 2384 |
| | **Panel B: Men's Interest** | | |
| T1 | -0.025 | 0.074 | -0.034 |
| | (0.064) | (0.069) | (0.068) |
| T2 | -0.080 | 0.078 | -0.021 |
| | (0.061) | (0.062) | (0.070) |
| T3 | 0.055 | 0.187*** | 0.084 |
| | (0.064) | (0.071) | (0.069) |
| Within T Control | 0.014 | 0.069 | 0.029 |
| | (0.061) | (0.066) | (0.067) |
| Constant | 0.350* | 0.836*** | 0.215 |
| | (0.185) | (0.106) | (0.173) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.253 | 0.194 | 0.227 |
| # Observations | 2434 | 2434 | 2413 |

*Notes*: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All columns show results using OLS estimation and all three outcomes are standardized. All three outcomes used in this table are combined into a standardized index to form the outcome variable for Column (2) of Table 2.7. Column (1) uses responses to the question "How interested are you in political TV shows?" as outcome. Column (2) uses responses to the question "How interested are you in political issues / topics or problems?" Column (3) uses responses to the question "How interested would you say you were in the 2018 Election?". All three questions are asked on a Likert scale. * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$

Table B.5: Treatment Effects on Self Efficacy

| | **Panel A: Women's Self-Efficacy** | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) **Qualified to Participate** | (2) **Informed about Voting** | (3) **Politics too Complicated** |
| T1 | -0.022 | -0.045 | -0.012 |
| | (0.072) | (0.075) | (0.068) |
| T2 | -0.056 | -0.013 | -0.020 |
| | (0.072) | (0.076) | (0.066) |
| T3 | -0.038 | -0.038 | -0.027 |
| | (0.065) | (0.072) | (0.063) |
| Within T Control | 0.041 | 0.124 | -0.076 |
| | (0.066) | (0.076) | (0.067) |
| Constant | -0.789*** | -0.310 | 0.377 |
| | (0.271) | (0.332) | (0.240) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.227 | 0.087 | 0.132 |
| # Observations | 2411 | 2363 | 2410 |
| | **Panel B: Men's View of Women's Efficacy** | | |
| T1 | -0.046 | -0.006 | 0.007 |
| | (0.077) | (0.071) | (0.067) |
| T2 | -0.078 | 0.114 | -0.122* |
| | (0.076) | (0.073) | (0.065) |
| T3 | -0.032 | 0.068 | 0.034 |
| | (0.079) | (0.071) | (0.070) |
| Within T Control | -0.045 | 0.011 | -0.054 |
| | (0.071) | (0.072) | (0.068) |
| Constant | -0.636** | -0.023 | 0.171 |
| | (0.266) | (0.336) | (0.323) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.200 | 0.125 | 0.113 |
| # Observations | 2429 | 2423 | 2429 |

*Notes*: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All columns show results using OLS estimation and all three outcomes are standardized. All three outcomes used in this table are combined into a standardized index to form the outcome variable for Column (3) of Table 2.7. For women (Panel A), the questions used as outcomes are agreement on a likert scale with the following statements respectively: (1) I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics as a citizen, (2) I think that I am well-informed about the process of how to cast my vote in the next election and (disagreement with) (3) Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on. For men (Panel B), the questions are the same, except they are asked about the women in their households e.g. "I consider women in my household to be well-qualified to participate in politics as a citizen." * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

Table B.6: Treatment Effects on Men's Logistical Support

| | Panel A: Women's Responses | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) **Organizing Transport** | (2) **Sharing HH Chores** | (3) **Waiting at PS** |
| T1 | -0.101 | 0.041 | -0.114 |
| | (0.067) | (0.065) | (0.074) |
| T2 | -0.049 | -0.003 | -0.006 |
| | (0.064) | (0.067) | (0.075) |
| T3 | 0.106 | 0.138** | 0.131* |
| | (0.066) | (0.064) | (0.073) |
| Within T Control | 0.057 | 0.058 | 0.091 |
| | (0.062) | (0.063) | (0.070) |
| Constant | 0.183 | -0.242 | 0.527*** |
| | (0.125) | (0.235) | (0.117) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.224 | 0.240 | 0.161 |
| # Observations | 2374 | 2377 | 2372 |
| | **Panel B: Men's Responses** | | |
| T1 | 0.046 | -0.049 | 0.108 |
| | (0.065) | (0.069) | (0.071) |
| T2 | 0.038 | -0.144** | 0.155** |
| | (0.070) | (0.065) | (0.070) |
| T3 | 0.150** | 0.089 | 0.213*** |
| | (0.066) | (0.069) | (0.070) |
| Within T Control | 0.068 | 0.006 | 0.108 |
| | (0.068) | (0.067) | (0.070) |
| Constant | 0.668*** | 0.592** | 0.491** |
| | (0.137) | (0.263) | (0.191) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.168 | 0.186 | 0.137 |
| # Observations | 2418 | 2394 | 2359 |

*Notes*: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All columns show results using OLS estimation. All three outcomes used in this table are indicator variables combined into a standardized index to form the outcome variable for Column (4) of Table 2.7. For women (Panel A), the questions used as outcomes are responses to the question "How willing were the men in your household to help with the following things before the election/on election day?" For men (Panel B), the questions used as outcome are yes or no responses to the question "Did you do any of the following before the election/on election day?" The relevant actions for each column respectively are (1) Organizing transport/taking women to the polling station on election day, (2) Sharing household duties so that women had time to vote and (3) Waiting for women at the polling station. * $p<0.10$, ** $p<0.05$, *** $p<0.01$.

Table B.7: Treatment Effects on the Perception of Descriptive Norms around Women's Political Participation

| | Panel A: Women's Responses | | |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (1) | (2) | (3) |
| | **Voting** | **Corner Meeting Participation** | **Political Rally Attendance** |
| T1 | -0.057 | -0.086 | -0.028 |
| | (0.066) | (0.071) | (0.061) |
| T2 | 0.035 | -0.034 | 0.075 |
| | (0.064) | (0.073) | (0.068) |
| T3 | 0.015 | -0.094 | 0.003 |
| | (0.063) | (0.073) | (0.065) |
| Within T Control | 0.019 | -0.024 | 0.013 |
| | (0.067) | (0.073) | (0.066) |
| Constant | 0.873*** | -0.760*** | -0.530*** |
| | (0.109) | (0.136) | (0.136) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.284 | 0.199 | 0.184 |
| # Observations | 2435 | 2435 | 2435 |
| | **Panel B: Men's Responses** | | |
| T1 | 0.014 | 0.093 | 0.019 |
| | (0.070) | (0.082) | (0.075) |
| T2 | 0.021 | 0.015 | -0.077 |
| | (0.071) | (0.083) | (0.075) |
| T3 | -0.029 | 0.026 | -0.073 |
| | (0.068) | (0.078) | (0.069) |
| Within T Control | 0.023 | 0.035 | -0.032 |
| | (0.067) | (0.074) | (0.070) |
| Constant | -0.266 | 0.052 | 0.627*** |
| | (0.484) | (0.218) | (0.206) |
| UC FEs | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| R-Squared | 0.256 | 0.199 | 0.273 |
| # Observations | 2433 | 2433 | 2433 |

*Notes*: Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the ward level. All columns show results using OLS estimation. All three outcomes used in this table are indicator variables combined into a standardized index to form the outcome variable for Column (6) of Table 2.7. The questions ask respondents to think of 5 women in their neighborhood and answer how many of them (1) Cast their vote in 2018 elections, (2) Participate in a corner meeting and (3) Go to a political rally. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.